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IN DEFENSE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES: SAVING THE BABY,
TOSSING OUT THE BATH WATER, AND
CONSTRUCTING A NEW SINK IN THE PROCESS
David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, & Zev J. Eigent
In its 1991 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.' decision, the
Supreme Court held that employers could require as a condition of
employment that employees agree to arbitrate their Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") 2 claims unless the employees could prove that
Congress had "evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue."3  Subsequently, lower courts
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1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2. See generally Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994 &
Supp. 1 1995).
3. 500 U.S. at 26. The Court noted that there are three places for plaintiffs to find
evidence to satisfy their burden of proving congressional intent: (1) in the text of the ADEA, (2)
its legislative history, or (3) an "inherent conflict' between arbitration and the ADEA's
underlying purposes. See id The Gilmer decision was not the first time the Supreme Court
held that federal statutory claims are arbitrable. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (enforcing arbitration of claims under the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994)); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987) (enforcing an arbitration agreement under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68 (1994); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985) (holding that claims brought under the Sherman Act of July 2, 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1994)), ana the Federal Automobile Dealers' Suits Against Manufacturers Act of 1956, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1994), are arbitrable). Collectively, these three cases are sometimes
referred to as the "Mitsubishi Trilogy."
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extended Gilmer to cover other discrimination claims, including those
arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and
the Americans with Disabilities Act5 ("ADA").6 In its 1998 Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co.7 decision, the Ninth Circuit held that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991' (the "1991 Act") prohibits mandatory9 arbitration
agreements."° Several district courts have also held that the 1991 Act and
the ADA prohibit mandatory arbitration." However, in Seus v. John
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994).
6. See, e.g., Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997)
(requiring arbitration of New Jersey Law Against Discrimination); Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997) (requiring arbitration of Title VII and state law
discrimination claims); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th
Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's claim under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1998), is arbitrable); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that sexual harassment claims under Title VII are arbitrable); Bender v.
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that a Titie VII claim was
subject to arbitration); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that Gilmer controlled on the issue of the enforceability of a pre-dispute agreement to
arbitrate a sexual discrimination claim under Title VII); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that claims of sexual harassment and sexual
discrimination under KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) are arbitrable).
The ADA and Title VII both contain provisions encouraging resolution of disputes
through alternate dispute resolution ("ADR") mechanisms, including arbitration, "where
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law." Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12212. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Gilmer wrote that the party opposing
arbitration bears the onerous burden of showing that "Congress itself has evinced an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). But see supra Part III.C; Patrick 0.
Gudridge, Title VlArbitration, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 209 (1995) (attempting to
distinguish Title VII-based claims from ADEA-based claims for arbitrability purposes).
7. 144F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
8. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-1100 (1991) (codified in scattered sections
of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
9. Agreements requiring employers and employees to arbitrate any and all disputes
resulting from the course of employment, typically introduced upon hiring, are generally
referred to as "mandatory." While this label carries with it some connotation of a coercive
situation, we prefer it to the alternative label commonly used, "pre-dispute arbitration
agreements." ' Pre-dispute ' is both less offensive and less accurate than "mandatory."
Employers who have such policies make agreements a condition of employment. We believe
the term mandatory better describes this take-it-or-leave-it "offer." We do not believe, however,
that something is inherently bad because it is mandatory. In fact, we are in favor of a number of
mandatory employment regulations such as: cleanliness standards with which food service
employees must comply, health and safety standards that employees must follow, and
professional licensing requirements that medical employees must meet.
10. The court writes: "We hold that, under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employers may
not by such means compel individuals to waive their Title VII right to a judicial forum."
Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185.
11. Four other district courts have held that the 1991 Act and/or the ADA prohibit
mandatory arbitration. See O'Hara v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Educ., No. C2-95-554, 1998 U.S. Dist.
1999] EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
Nuveen & Co., 2 the Third Circuit rejected Duffield and held that the 1991
Act does not prohibit and, in fact, endorses mandatory arbitration. 3 The
Fifth Circuit has followed the Seus holding.
4
In debating the 1991 Act and the ADA, Congress did not debate or
directly address mandatory arbitration. Thus, if the Supreme Court grants
certiorari and follows the Gilmer holding, it must consider a congressional
intent that is ambiguous and debatable. Because a good part of this debate
has its roots in the underlying controversy regarding mandatory
arbitration's attributes and deficiencies, this Article focuses on the practical
realities associated with mandatory arbitration in the hopes that, in addition
to statutory interpretation, the Court's determination of congressional intent
will be illuminated by discussion of sound public policy rationale.
Therefore, in this Article we analyze mandatory arbitration from both legal
and public policy perspectives.
Unlike the volumes of academic attention previously devoted to this
subject, this Article does not view mandatory arbitration in a vacuum. Too
often mandatory arbitration is rejected because of its alleged faults without
comparing it to the alternatives. 5 By comparing arbitration to the current
LEXIS 13289 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 1998); Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 3779,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9226 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1998); Winkler v. Pacific Brokerage Servs.,
Inc., No. 97C7340, 1998 WL 341622 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 1998); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998).
12. 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998).
13. The Seus court explicitly states:
Thus, we respectfully disagree with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.
1998). As we understand the opinion in that case, the court reads the prefatory
clause, "where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law," in light of the
legislative history, as a codification of a particular view of the decisional law
regarding Title VII arbitration as it existed prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer. To us, it seems most reasonable to read this clause as a
reference to the FAA. Moreover, we find nothing in the legislative history
suggesting that this hortatory provision was intended to codify, and thus freeze,
any particular view of the case law. Finally, even if we were to accept
"authorized by law" as intended to codify case law, we would find the text
incompatible with the notion that the law codified was case law inconsistent
with a Supreme Court case decided six months before the passage of the Act.
146 F.3d at 183.
14. See Mouton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1998); see also 24
Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. A079502, 1998 Cal. App. LEXIS 809 (Ct. App. Sept.
28, 1998).
15. For example, a ubiquitous complaint about mandatory arbitration, addressed more
thoroughly below, is that employees are not given any free choice in selecting the forum for
their discrimination case. As this Article demonstrates, such lack of freedom should be
compared with the alternatives available to most employees seeking redress: filing a charge with
the EEOC or hiring an attorney and filing a claim in state or federal court. If these options are
not as viable in reality as they may seem from the view from an ivory tower, it may be unwise to
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system of adjudicating disputes, this Article seeks to develop a more
realistic and pragmatic perception of mandatory arbitration.
Almost immediately after the Gilmer decision, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), academics, and various employee
rights advocates argued that mandatory arbitration agreements were unfair
and should be made unlawful.'" In July 1997, the EEOC issued a policy
statement on mandatory arbitration.' 7 This statement, which includes a
detailed basis for its conclusion, states that so-called "Gilmer agreements"
are contrary to the fundamental principles evinced in the discrimination
laws.' 8 As such, the EEOC will contest such agreements. In contrast, we
argue that mandatory arbitration is the best available procedure for serving
the purposes of antidiscrimination legislation. To support this argument,
we first examine the current system of adjudication that the EEOC and
other critics wish to perpetuate. Second, we describe the current legal
status of ADR. Third, we outline a Model Arbitration Act that provides a
procedure for adjudicating disputes that is more efficient, fairer, and less
susceptible to abuse than the current court system. Finally, we contend that
the critics of mandatory arbitration ignore the reality of the current system
and that their arguments are either meritless or resolvable.
I. EVALUATING THE CURRENT SYSTEM
A. Employment Discrimination Adjudication Is a Growth Industry
In 1996 alone, there were 141,828 discrimination cases filed, a 30%
increase from the number of charges filed in 1989.' 9 Between 1991 and
dismiss mandatory arbitration simply based on a moral objection to anything mandated by
employers.
16. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP.
Cr. REV. 331, 385-88; Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims:
Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 29 (1996); Sharona
Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive Dispute
Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 131 (1996); Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Judith P. Vladeck, "Yellow Dog Contracts" Revisited, N.Y. L.J.,
July 24, 1995, at 7; Heidi M. Hellekson, Note, Taking the "Alternative" out of the Dispute
Resolution of Title VII Claims: The Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of
Arbitration Agreements Arising out of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D. L. REv. 435 (1994);
Mark D. Klimek, Note, Discrimination Claims Under Title VI: Where Mandatory Arbitration
Goes Too Far, 8 OHio ST. I ON DIsP. RESOL. 425 (1993).
17. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
133, atE-4 (July 11, 1997).
18. See id.
19. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNTY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS FY
1986-1996 (May 1997) [hereinafter ENFORCEmENT STATISTICS]. In 1994, there were 158,582
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1995, discrimination cases filed in federal court increased 109%.20 Over
the past twenty years, employment litigation has increased by 400%."
There are at least three major changes in the law that may be responsible
for this increase.' The first change is the increase in the number of
protected classes. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
color, national origin, religion, and sex. 3 Congressional legislation has
further expanded the protected classes to include age,24 pregnancy, 2 and
cases fled; 154,609 were filed in 1995. See id.
20. See Peter Eisler, Waiting for Justice, USA ToDAY, Aug. 15, 1995, at 1A.
21. See Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of Employment
Disputes, LAB. LAW., Summer 1997, at 21, 21 (citing Discharge Is Now Major Focus of Job
Discrimination Suits, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 164, at A-3 (Aug. 23, 1991)).
22. There may be additional explanations for the continued burgeoning federal
employment discrimination litigation caseloads. Professors John J. Donohue and Peter
Siegelman present several explanations including: increased unemployment rates, general
economic downturn, demographic growth in the protected workforce, the "better jobs effect"--
the movement of minorities and women into better paying jobs, and the "integration effect"---an
integrated workforce is more likely to produce litigation because minorities or women who
work by themselves have no benchmarks against whom they can measure their treatment to
determine whether it is discriminatory. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 1001
(1991); see also Maijorie L. Baldwin & William G. Johnson, The Employment Effects of Wage
Discrimination Against Black Men, 49 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 302 (1996) (evaluating
Donohue and Siegelman's article and proposing alternative explanations for discriminatory
marketplace effects).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-§2000e-17 (1994).
24. The ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994 & Supp. 11995), took effect in 1968. A study
conducted by Donohue and Siegelman reveals that 15.1% of the 1,250 randomly selected
employment civil rights cases filed in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, New Orleans, New York,
Philadelphia, and San Francisco from 1972 to 1987 were based on age discrimination. See
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 22, at 996. They estimate that the ADEA alone increased
litigation by 829 additional cases in 1989. See id. Christine Jolls reports that:
[a]ge discrimination claims accounted for 51% of the monetary damages
obtained in employment discrimination cases brought by the Equal Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) between 1984 and 1988 and for approximately 25% of the
EEOC's caseload over that period. Likewise, ADEA claims filed with the
EEOC grew 34% between 1989 and 1993 and nearly 200% over the 1980-1984
period.
Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 TEX. L. REv.
1813, 1814 (1996). Moreover, she notes that the
EEOC itself brings only a modest fraction of all age discrimination cases, but it
brings them in rough proportion to initial claims filed with the agency.., and
initial claims in turn reflect the overall body of employment discrimination
cases (due to the requirement that the plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies).
Id. at 1814 n.5 (citation omitted); see also George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The
Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination Law, 24 . LEGAL STUD. 491,505 (1995).
25. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994) (defining
sexual discrimination terms: "The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
19991
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disability."" In 1994, disability claims accounted for 20.7% of the total
number of charges filed with the EEOC.27 Age cases accounted for
18.7%.2 In addition, many states, cities, and counties protect other
classifications such as marital status29 and sexual orientation."
The federal courts authored the second change in the law by
increasing the number of causes of action available to plaintiffs. The courts
conditions."). The PDA has been in effect since 1978. Pregnancy discrimination has not
contributed greatly to increased employment discrimination litigation primarily because it did
not create a new protected class as the ADA and the ADEA did. Before the PDA was passed, a
pregnant woman was necessarily included in the already protected class of women, and the
PDA merely expanded that sex/gender category. Pregnancy cases constituted a mere 2.8% of
the cases in the ABF survey (from Jan. 1, 1985 to Mar. 21, 1987) discussed by Donohue and
Siegelman, supra note 22, at 992-96. In addition, demographic changes in workforce
composition have shown that more educated women are working in higher paying positions.
See id. Higher paid and more educated plaintiffs are more likely to sue for discrimination
because damages are based on back pay, and because more educated persons are more likely to
be aware that they have federal rights protecting them from discrimination and that they can
seek redress if these rights are violated.
26. The ADA requires that covered employers make reasonable accommodations for the
known disability of any "otherwise qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5). A "qualified individual with a disability" is a person with a "disability," defined as
something that "substantially limits" at least one "major life activity," who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the "essential functions" of the job. 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8). The ADA continues by defining a disability as also including being regarded as
having a disability. See 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(c). The ADA became effective in July 1992 for
employers with 25 or more employees. It did not go into effect for employers with 15 or more
employees until July 1994.
27. See ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 19.
28. See id. Note, however, that there exists the potential for claims to overlap and possibly
inflate the significance of these percentages. For instance, some plaintiffs can and do bring
claims alleging multiple types of discrimination, such as discrimination against race, sex, and
age, if they can make out the requisite prima facie requirements. Donohue and Siegelman,
supra note 22, filter out the overlap effect, but the EEOC statistics do not, U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Charges
FY 1992-FY 1998 (last modified Jan. 14, 1999) <http:llwww.eeoc.gov/statsladea.html>.
29. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19572 (West 1995 & Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-
60 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.07 (West Supp.
1998); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368-1 (Michie 1994); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(a)
(West Supp. 1997) ("[flreedom from discrimination against any individual because of his or her
race, color, religion, sex, national ancestry, age, marital status, physical or mental handicap");
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-102 (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN., HuMAN RELATIONS
COMM'N § 16 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 49-2-304 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.5 (West Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. §
2.1-716 (Michie Supp. 1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (West Supp. 1998); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 1997).
30. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (1995); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-2512 (Supp. 1997); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 368-1 (Michie 1994); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 151B § 3A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10.5-12.5 (West Supp. 1997); RI. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-1 to -9
(1995 & Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 961 (1995); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 49.60.180
(West Supp. 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 1997).
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developed the legal theories of sexual harassment" and disparate impact 2
and resurrected section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
protects employees and applicants from racial discrimination even if the
employer is not covered by Title VII.33 Finally, the 1991 Act made
employment discrimination claims more attractive to plaintiffs and their
attorneys by providing for punitive damages, compensatory damages, and
jury trials.' In addition to increasing the number of claims filed, the new
damages scheme increased the average full and nuisance settlements.
When damages consisted of back pay exclusively, employees' damages
were capped as soon as they found new employment that paid as much or
more than they had earned previously. In such situations, an employer
31. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1986) (holding that a hostile
environment caused by sexual conduct can create a cause of action under Title VIE).
32. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971) (holding that an employment
policy that is neutral on its face can constitute a Title VII violation if it creates an adverse
impact). For example, the Duke Power Company required applicants for certain positions to be
high school graduates. See id. at 425-27. The Court examined the 1960 North Carolina census
and found that 34% of the state's white male residents were high school graduates while only
12% of the African-American males had diplomas. See id at 430 n.6. This disparity, according
to the Court, constituted a Title VII violation. See id. at 430-36. Some commentators, however,
argue that Congress never intended to outlaw disparate impact. See Michael Evan Gold,
Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition
ofEmploymentDiscrimination anda Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUs. REL. L.J. 429,489-
564 (1985). The 1991 Act ended the adverse impact debate, if there was one, by adopting the
Griggs holding as the law. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat.
1071, 1074-75 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
33. Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits discrimination against racial
minorities in the making and enforcement of contracts. See An Act to Protect All Persons in the
United States in Their Civil Rights, and Furnish the Means of Their Vindication, ch. 31, 14 Stat.
27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)). Any employer, regardless of the
number of employees it employs, can be subject to a section 1981 action. See id. In Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Supreme Court held that section 1981 is
a separate cause of action from Title VII and that the timely filing of a Title VII claim with the
EEOC does not toll the running of the statute of limitations under section 1981. In Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the Supreme Court held that section 1981
protection extends only to hiring, and not to promotions, or on-the-job discrimination. The 1991
Act overturned Patterson. Section 1981 claims can now be brought regarding promotions or
harassment and there is no cap on the amount of punitive damages. Also, unlike Title VII,
which defines an employer as a company that has fifteen or more employees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1994), section 1981 claims can be brought against any employer regardless of size, 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1994). Section 1981 claims (without reference to Title VII) accounted for 4.4% of the
ABF sample described by Donohue and Siegelman, supra note 22, at 996.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). Prior to the 1991 Act, damages consisted of
reinstatement, back pay, and attorneys' fees, or equitable relief generally. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g)(1) (1994); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,415-25 (1975). The 1991
Act provides for punitive and compensatory damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(a) (1994). Such
damages, however, are "capped" based on the number of employees employed by the company.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994). Thus, for example, punitive and compensatory damages
for an employer with less than 101 employees are capped at $50,000. See id Such damages for
employers with 500 or more employees are capped at $300,000. See id.
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could almost always settle the case for back pay only.s" Now, employees
have an incentive to reject settlement offers of full back pay and instead
pursue their lawsuits in the hope that a jury will try to teach the employer a
lesson by awarding the employee damages far exceeding the true value of
the case. Thus, plaintiffs and their attorneys may turn down what had once
been full relief in the hopes of winning the employment discrimination
lottery-an exorbitant jury award 6
The current system for adjudicating discrimination cases is so
expensive and inefficient that it is unfair to both employers and employees.
Below we describe the system and then explain why it is not beneficial for
employers or for employees.
B. The EEOC's System for Adjudicating Discrimination Disputes Is
Expensive and Inefficient
To file a discrimination lawsuit against an employer, an employee
must first file a charge of discrimination with either the EEOC or with a
state or local agency that is authorized to investigate such claims." The
agency with which the employee files a charge will investigate the
allegation and try to settle the matter by having the employer remunerate
and/or reinstate the employee. If the employer and employee cannot agree
on a settlement, the agency determines whether there is cause to believe
that discrimination occurred. If the agency finds "no cause," it issues a
"right to sue letter" so that the employee can file an action in federal or
state court, provided that the employee decides not to drop the case. If the
agency finds cause, it.may, depending on the agency, either: (1) issue a
"right to sue letter," (2) set the case for trial within its own administrative
adjudication process, or (3) become the employee's counsel and file an
action in federal court on the claimant's behalf.
35. Employees in such situations could pursue their claim to obtain reinstatement In most
situations, however, newly employed workers would have little, if any, incentive to return to
work for employers that they sued.
36. See COMM'N ON THE FuruRE OF WORKER-MANAGER RELATIONS, DEP'T OF LABOR,
FACT FINDiNG REPORT 110 (1994) (characterizing juries' responses to employees' claims of
discrimination as "lottery-like"), quoted in Ellwood F. Oakley III & Donald 0. Mayer,
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims and the Challenge of Contemporary
Federalism, 47 S.C. L. REV. 475, 476 (1996).
37. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994). Employees can elect to
file with the federal, state, or local agency. In most circumstances, the agencies have concurrent
jurisdiction so that claims are cross-filed among each agency. In other circumstances, the local
agency stands on its own so that employees can have their claims investigated more than once.
38. One commentator notes that instead of "issuing a no-cause finding, many EEOC
offices inform the plaintiff... of its intent to do so and afford the plaintiff an opportunity to
request a right-to-sue notice." Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the
Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 9 n.35 (1996). Thus,
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The administrative procedures should represent a system that combats
employment discrimination by providing employees with an agency that
investigates and resolves charges (regardless of potential damages) without
exposing employees and employers to the high costs associated with
litigation. The current system is not accomplishing these goals. Instead,
employers accused of discrimination face outrageous costs, and employees'
claims are not investigated in a thorough or timely manner.
1. The System Is Expensive for Employers
When a discrimination claim is filed, employers are required to
complete a questionnaire and provide the investigating agency with a
position statement. Responding to a charge costs an employer who does
not have in-house counsel thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees. 9 If the
case is not resolved at the agency level and, instead, is adjudicated in court,
the employer's attorneys' fees will almost always be in excess of $50,000
and could exceed $500,000, regardless of the merits of the case.4 O
Additional employer costs include the loss of productivity of other
employees involved in the case, adverse publicity, and of course, liability.
Because defending discrimination lawsuits in federal court can cost an
employer hundreds of thousands or even over one million dollars,4 '
employers are induced to settle a case regardless of the worthiness of the
plaintiffs' allegations.
Not only do strong incentives exist for employers to settle
discrimination charges levied against them, but the administrative
procedures themselves also motivate investigators to settle cases. For
many years, the EEOC and numerous state agencies evaluated their
when the employee needs to obtain counsel or when his case is tried, a no-cause finding does
not prejudice the plaintiffs case. See id. This alternative, if it is prevalently exercised, reveals
two things: (1) a "no-cause" finding is concededly not equivalent to saying that the plaintiffs
case has "no merit," and (2) the EEOC lacks confidence in its own procedures.
39. Two management-side attorneys, David Ritter and Peter Albrecht, estimate that
responding to an EEOC charge of discrimination will likely cost anywhere between $2,500 and
$10,000. Telephone Interview with David Ritter, chair of the Labor and Employment
Department at Altheimer & Grey in Chicago, Ill., and Peter Albrecht, partner at Godfrey &
Kahn in Madison, Wis. (Mar. 12, 1998).
40. See id
41. See Michael Barrier & David Warner, Lawsuits Gone Wild, NATION'S Bus., Feb. 1,
1998, at 12 (citing several cases where employers were made to pay significant amounts after
losing discrimination lawsuits). One jury award for $89.5 million dollars, which covered
economic harm, emotional distress, and punitive damages, was one of the largest awards ever in
a state or federal employment discrimination case. See id. The appellate court reduced the
damages to $7.8 million. See Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889, 912-13 (Ct.
App. 1997).
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investigators by examining how many cases they closed per quarter.42
From the time they are assigned to cases, investigators push employers and
employees to settle.43 In fact, it was standard procedure for some state
investigators to attempt to settle cases without even discussing the cases'
merits or reviewing the files.' In the 1980s and early 1990s, the EEOC
accepted and investigated all charges.45 In addition, the EEOC actually
helped employees "fit" their facts into the prima facie criteria.46 This policy
produced a backlog of cases, created cynicism about the enforcement of the
discrimination laws, and originated what we refer to as the discrimination
"de facto severance system." We define the de facto severance system as a
process whereby employees file baseless discrimination charges because
they know that their former employers are willing to pay a nominal amount
of money47 in order to avoid the aggravation, costs, and losses of time,
resources, and productivity that inevitably arise in defending such
allegations. Smaller companies that do not have in-house counsel or
sophisticated human resource departments are especially vulnerable to this
42. In 1993, Linda G. Morra, the General Accounting Office's director of education and
employment issues, reported that of 68,000 cases closed in 1992, the EEOC found no cause in
61% and reasonable cause in 2.4%. See EEOC's Perfonnance in Handling Caseload Criticized
by Witness at House Hearing, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 143, at D-3 (July 28, 1993)
[hereinafter EEOC Performance Criticized]. She stated that this disparity could be explained, in
part, by the fact that EEOC investigators have quarterly quotas for case closings, and those who
do not meet this quota are given lower performance ratings. See id.
43. Under its old policy, the EEOC did not encourage investigators' involvement in
settlement discussions until after a case was investigated. As explained below, this policy has
been changed; the EEOC now resembles state agencies in this regard. "Charges under
investigation that do not fall within the national or local enforcement plans and that are in
Categories A or B may be settled at any time by the enforcement staff, with or without
consultation with legal staff, as appropriate." EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNrIY COMM'N,
PRIORrrY CHARGE HANDLING PROCEDURES 11 (1995) [hereinafter PRIoRlY CHARGE HANDLING
PROCEDURES].
44. As an example, the Illinois Department of Human Rights used to assign "interim
investigators" for this purpose. Such investigators were assigned to the case for several weeks.
If the case did not settle, it was taken away from the interim investigator. The case would then
sit for approximately two years before it was assigned to an investigator who would examine the
merits.
45. The EEOC's charge processing task force headed by Paul M. Igasald recommended
that the Commission rescind the "full investigation" policy that had been inferred from a
Commission resolution of December 6, 1983. See PRIORITY CHARGE HANDLING PROCEDURES,
supra note 43, at 2. This recommendation was adopted and incorporated into the EEOC's
national enforcement plan. See id. at 1-2.
46. The nature of the investigation system encourages this behavior. The federal
government bases the amount of funding it will provide to a state agency on the number of
claims that are resolved. See EQUAL OPPORTuNrrY COMM'N, FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE
AGENCIES ("FEPAs") 1 (1994). Consequently, state agencies have an incentive to help create
charges, even if they believe the law has not been violated.
47. We define nominal as an amount that is the equivalent of between two weeks' and six
months' pay.
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practice.
De facto severance is a natural outgrowth of -the practical realities
associated with the system presently in place to enforce antidiscrimination
laws. It exists because it is simple for employees to file charges of
discrimination, yet costly for employers to defend against such charges. In
order to file a charge of discrimination, employees must first establish a
prima facie case. s This is an easy task. Employees need only prove that:
(1) they are members of a protected class; (2) they were qualified for the
position; (3) they were "mistreated" by their employer or potential
employer; and (4) employees who do not belong to that protected class
were not mistreated.49 To establish a prima facie case, employees are not
required to provide any evidence of discrimination. They do not need an
attorney, and they need not pay any filing fees.
Given such easy to satisfy criteria, it is not surprising that the EEOC
has not been able to keep up with the claims generated. Between 1989 and
1992, the number of charges that the EEOC received increased by 26%
while EEOC staffing decreased by 6%." The combination of increased
claims and fewer investigators has yielded extensive delays. On average,
the EEOC takes over a year to investigate a claim." However, this number
is likely misleadingly low. The EEOC data include cases that are
immediately rejected, withdrawn, settled, or closed because the plaintiffs
attorney requests an immediate right to sue. These quickly disposed of
charges are therefore factored into the calculation to produce a number that
underestimates the amount of time the EEOC spends on the cases that it
actually investigates. In fact, once an investigator is assigned, it can take
several additional years before the case is resolved. In 1995, the EEOC had
over 193,000 open cases. 2
C. The EEOC Implemented a New System That Compromises Employee
Claims
In 1995, the EEOC sought to eliminate its system's inefficiencies by
creating new procedures to reduce the backlog of cases and to weed out
frivolous claims. These procedures included: (1) encouraging settlement at
all steps of the process, (2) priority charge handling, and (3) rescission of
the full investigation policy.53 These changes do not, however, resolve the
48. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973).
49. See id
50. See EEOC Performance Criticized, supra note 42, at D-3.
51. See 1994 EEOC ANN. REP. 11-12.
52. See Eisler, supra note 20, at IA.
53. See PRIoRrry CHARGE HANDLING PRODECURES, supra note 43, at 2-3. This report
indicates that:
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system's inefficiencies. Instead, they perpetuate and exacerbate some of
the problems identified above. Moreover, they effectively make it
impossible for some employees to have their cases heard.
Encouraging settlement at all phases of the investigation further
institutionalizes the practice of providing de facto severance for employees
with baseless claims and only nuisance payments for employees with
meritorious claims. Instead of attemp5ting to discover if the employer
violated the law, investigators simply try to "make the case go away."
Pushing settlements before discovering any facts results in attaining
efficiency at the expense of attaining justice.- Such a result frustrates
parties on both sides of the issue and negatively affects the law's
credibility. Encouraging settlement, however, is not nearly as dangerous as
the policies of priority charge handling and rescission of the investigation
of all cases.
The new priority charge-handling policy requires investigators to
place each case into one of three categories before they have discovered
any facts.5 Cases placed in the "A" or highest priority classification fall
within the national or local enforcement plan. 6 The national and local
enforcement plans focus on class actions and new areas of law. An
example of an "A" case is the class action filed by the EEOC against
The Commission unanimously approved the following motion:
That settlement efforts be encouraged at all stages of the administrative
process and that the Commission may accept settlements providing
"substantial relief' [as opposed to full relie]] when the evidence of record
indicates a violation or "appropriate relief' at an earlier stage in the
investigation.
Id. at 3.
Furthermore, a General Accounting Office ("GAO") study illustrates how, in an
attempt to reduce burgeoning backlogs which have existed almost since the EEOC's
inception, the EEOC took two distinct measures that ultimately adversely affected plaintiffs'
abilities to recover even with meritorious claims. See Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC:
Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 219 (1995). The "Rapid Charge
System," which narrowed charges and investigations and encouraged settlement at the
earliest stages, is the first of these measures. See id. at 262. The second is the EEOC's
raising of the standard for a finding of cause. See id. at 261-64. It did this in 1977 and
again in 1984, each time followed by a dramatic increase in the ratio of no-cause to cause
findings. See id. at 274. By 1989, no-cause findings were found 17 times more often than
cause findings. See id.
54. See Ritter & Albrecht, supra note 39 (reporting that this problem occurred when the
llinois Department of Human Rights assigned interim investigators who were charged with
attempting to settle cases before they investigated).
55. See PRIORrrY CHARGE HANDLING PROCEDURES, supra note 43, at 1.
56. See id. Category "A" also includes "other charges where further investigation will
probably result in a cause finding. Cases should also be classified as Category A if irreparable
harm will result unless processing is expedited." l. at 4.
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Mitsubishi. 7 In this suit, several hundred women complained that
company officials sexually harassed them." In contrast, a garden variety
discrimination case will never be classified as an "A." By "garden variety"
we mean a discrimination case involving only one or two employees who
allege that they were not hired or terminated based on their protected
characteristic(s), and the employer denies that any unlawful motive played
a role in the decision making. It is not a class action. There are no new or
important issues of law present. Instead, the case turns on factual disputes.
Such a case will never be labeled an "A" regardless of the strength of the
evidence. Instead, such cases are labeled "B" priority.
59
"B" cases are investigated in due time, meaning that the EEOC will
eventually make a determination. However, these cases will not receive a
priority classification and will likely take approximately one year or more
before the investigation is complete. Once completed, claimants who do
not settle must begin the litigation process to adjudicate their claims. As
explained more fully below, litigation can take anywhere from two to eight
years.
Cases placed in the "C" category are, for all intents and purposes,
dead. The EEOC labels a case a "C" when it determines that the case is
either frivolous or that the agency lacks jurisdiction.' Such a
determination may seem appropriate because it conserves scarce resources
and reduces de facto severance by discouraging potential plaintiffs who
wish to capitalize on the employer's known incentives to settle. In
57. See EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 164 (C.D. 111. 1997).
58. See id. at 165.
59. See PaioRrrY CHARGE HANDLING PROCEDURES, supra note 43, at 6. The EEOC notes
that:
[m]any charges will initially appear to have some merit but will require
additional evidence to determine whether continued investigation is likely to
result in a cause finding. In addition, in other cases it will simply not be
possible to make a judgment regarding the merit of the charge at charge receipt.
In these cases, additional investigation will be needed, as resources permit, to
determine whether these charges should be moved into Category A and given
priority status or moved into Category C and dismissed.
Id at4.
60. See id at 5 ("A charge may be placed in Category "C" and dismissed when the office
has sufficient information from which to conclude that it is not likely that further investigation
will result in a cause finding."). The Priority Charge Handling Procedures list several examples
of appropriate "C" labeling: (1) where the EEOC lacks jurisdiction over an employer without 15
or more employees because employers with less than 15 employees are not covered by Title VII
or the ADA, see Employee Responsibilities and Conduct, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.18 (1997); (2)
charges where the allegations are not credible, including cases filed by repetitive charge filers, in
which, based on the large number of charges, the charging party is not credible; (3) charges
unsupported by any direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination, and the charging party
was in a position to have access to such evidence, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (1997); and (4)
ADEA charges filed more than 180-300 days after the date of violation.
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practice, however, the policy has resulted in the EEOC unjustly dismissing
claims. For example, in Reboh v. Citizens Committee for Children,"' the
employer answered a charge of sexual and religious harassment by stating
that it had less than fifteen employees.62  In response, the employee
identified nineteen employees, yet the EEOC failed to investigate.63
Instead, it immediately placed the case in its "C" category and dismissed it
for lack of jurisdiction6 The Southern District of New York, in a terse
opinion, found that there were at least fifteen employees. 6 In order to
defeat the defendant's motion to dismiss, the claimant's lawyers had to
spend over $10,000 of billable time, and the claimant spent more than
$3,000 in court costs. If Reboh did not have the resources to litigate, this
issue, she would have had no opportunity for justice. The Reboh case is
but one example of the likely result of the EEOC's policies and
procedures-the new system is harming plaintiffs with legitimate claims.
D. Statistical Analysis of the EEOC's Case Handling Reveals That
Employee Rights Are Not Being Adequately Safeguarded
In 1980, the EEOC found no cause in 28.5% of the 49,225 cases it
closed. ' In 1992, the agency found no cause in 61% of the 68,366 cases it
closed.67 Employers argued that the increase in the number of no-cause
findings reflects an increase in the number of frivolous claims filed. This
may be true because the proliferation of de facto severance encourages
employees, who know that their employers will settle baseless cases when
the settlement proposal is less than the costs of defense, to file frivolous
charges. There may be, however, another explanation for the increase in
the number of no-cause findings. A GAO study explained that the large
number of no-cause findings were due to the EEOC's failure to adequately
investigate between 41% and 82% of the cases.68 If the GAO conclusion is
61. No. 96802 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1997) (unpublished case) (on file with the authors).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id,
65. See id.
66. See Eisler, supra note 20, at 1A.
67. See ENFORCEMENT STATISnCS, supra note 19; EEOC Performance Criticized, supra
note 42, at D-3.
68. See GAO Report Charges EEOC with Failure to Fully Investigate Majority of
Complaints, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 198, at A-7 (Oct. 13, 1998) [hereinafter GAO Report].
This is not surprising since investigators are encouraged to, and are rewarded for, closing cases.
Agencies are also reluctant to find cause because such findings may necessitate the allocation of
increasingly scarce resources. An example of an agency that discourages cause findings is the
Pennsylvania Human Rights Office in Pittsburgh. See Interview with an investigator with the
Pennsylvania Human Rights Office, Pittsburgh, Pa. (1994). The Pennsylvania Human Rights
Office has an adjudication branch that tries cases that are found to have cause. See id. Such
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accurate, then employee rights advocates should be outraged about the new
priority system that compromises employees' cases.
The 1995 changes have made the numbers identified by the GAO even
more striking. From 1986 to 1990, the EEOC closed between 70,749 and
53,482 cases each year.69 During this time, the percentage of merit
resolutions 0 ranged from a high of 19% in 1990 to a low of 15% in 1986.7'
All other cases were dismissed because of a no-cause finding or an
administrative resolution.72 After the EEOC's new policy went into effect,
the number of resolutions increased to 91,774 in 1995 and to 103,467 in
1996.73 In 1994, the average investigator resolved 97.8 cases.74 In 1996,
the average was 139.' 5 What appears to be a tremendous increase in
productivity is merely a dismissal of a higher percentage of cases. In 1995,
merit resolutions dropped to a new low of 11.9%.76 In 1996, the number
dropped to 9.1%.77 Thus, of the 103,467 cases resolved, the EEOC closed
94,037 (90.8%) without the employee receiving a benefit or a finding of
78
cause.
Classification as a merit resolution does not mean that the case has
merit or that it has been resolved. De facto severance cases in which
employers settle for nuisance amounts are classified as merit resolutions
trials are expensive for the Agency. See id. It must pay for court costs, the judge, and other
expenses. See id To avoid such trials, the investigators are encouraged to try to settle cases
regardless of merit and discouraged from ever finding cause. See id. The legal department must
approve findings of cause. See id According to the investigators, their recommendations to
find cause are rejected unless the employee's case is considered impossible to lose. See id.
69. See ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 19.
70. Merit resolutions consist of the following: (1) settlements-cases that are settled prior
to a determination and the EEOC is a party to the agreement; (2) successful conciliations-cases
settled after a finding of cause; (3) unsuccessful conciliations--unsettled cases where there was
a finding of cause; or (4) withdrawal with benefits-the case was settled, but the EEOC was not
a party to the settlement agreement. See id
71. See id
72. Administrative resolutions are cases in which: (1) the agency could not find the
claimant, (2) the claimant failed to respond to the agency's communications, (3) the claimant
did not accept full relief, (4) new litigation precedent makes the case moot, (5) the claimant
withdrew the case without relief, and (6) the agency determined that it does not have
jurisdiction. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Definitions of Terms (last modified
Aug. 11, 1998) <http:leeoc.gov/stats/define.html>. Cases in which the employee retains an
attorney and requests a right to sue letter to begin litigation fall under (5) when the claimant
withdraws without relief.
73. See ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 19.
74. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT COMM'N, SUMMARY OF ENFORCEMENT DATA AND BUDGET
AND STAFFING INFORMATION FY 1991 THROUGH FY 1998 (1999) [hereinafter BUDGET AND
STAFFING INFORMATION].
75. See id
76. See ENFORCEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 19.
77. See id
78. See id
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even when such cases are frivolous. Likewise, the merit resolution
classification also encompasses worthy claims that are settled for nuisance
amounts. In 1996, 84% of the merit resolutions (8% of the total cases
resolved that year) were settled' 9 A majority of those cases were likely
settled for nuisance amounts. Without an in-depth analysis of these cases,
it is impossible to determine whether there were instances of de facto
severance or legitimate claims being compromised. In fact, in 1996 the
EEOC found "cause" in only 2.2% of the cases resolved." Of those
claimants whose charges were labeled "with cause," 33% (0.7% of the total
number of cases resolved that year) received damages in the form of a
settlement.8' Plaintiffs in the remaining 67% (1.5% of the total) had to
litigate if they wanted to obtain any relief.8 2
Three conclusions can be drawn from these statistics. First, it is
possible that numerous cases are "slipping through the cracks" at the EEOC
and being dismissed without receiving proper attention. This applies to the
cases resolved by either a finding of no-cause or an administrative closing.
Regarding the cases labeled no-cause, a GAO study found that the EEOC is
failing to fully investigate at least 41% of the cases in which it finds no
merit.83 The fact that 30% of the resolved cases are classified as
administrative closings may also result from the EEOC's procedures. In
1996, it took the EEOC an average of 379 days to resolve a case.' In that
time, employees often give up due to frustration or find new jobs, which
cuts off back pay and significantly limits their potential recovery so that
pursuing the case would be pointless. Cases in which employees give up
because of frustration with the system are administratively closed and
classified as without merit.85 This classification is made regardless of the
79. See id.
80. See Equal Opportunity Comm'n, All Statutes (last modified Jan. 14, 1999)
<http://www.eeoc.gov/statslall.html>. Note that in 1997, reasonable cause was found in 3.8%
of all charges; in 1998, reasonable cause was found in 4.6%. See id.
81. See i&t
82. See ENFORCEMENT STATIsTIcS, supra note 19.
83. See GAO Report, supra note 68, at A-7.
84. See BUDGET AND STAFFING INFORMATION, supra note 74.
85. Michael Selmi discusses the high percentage of plaintiffs' cases that fail due solely to
some procedural defect. See Selmi, supra note 38, at 10-11. These defects arise because of the
EEOC's internal case-processing structure and its problems handling backlog and delay in
investigations. The EEOC has 180 days from the time of filing of a complaint to investigate.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994). Because in almost all cases, the Agency takes longer
than that to complete its investigation, the plaintiff has a statutory right to request a "notice of a
right to sue," and the Agency must comply with this request. See Employee Responsibilities
and Conduct, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1997). The right to sue letter functions as the plaintiff's
ticket into court. Selmi compares this administrative hurdle with requiring a driver to apply for
a bridge token in advance and points out that the EEOC serves the sole function of issuing a
right to sue notice for approximately 25% of the claims filed. See Selmi, supra note 38, at 8-9.
Because a large number of the cases that are heard in federal court fail due to some
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facts. To paraphrase Roscoe Pound, instead of being labeled without merit,
such cases could be labeled "without justice."86
The second possible conclusion arises from the cases where an
employee requests a right to sue and begins litigation. If these cases
represent a high percentage of the administrative closings, then the EEOC
is simply an irrelevant procedural hoop through which claimants and their
attorneys must jump.'
The third possible conclusion to be drawn from observing the
outrageously small number of meritorious cases is, as employers would
argue, that the overwhelming majority of the cases filed are frivolous. If
this is the case, then the focus of discrimination legislation reform should
not be on finding ways of making the filing of claims easier and more
attractive. Instead, the concern should be employers' rights and costs.
Regardless of whether the EEOC is allowing meritorious cases to slip
through the cracks due to procedural inadequacies, whether plaintiffs view
the EEOC as irrelevant, or whether there are just too many frivolous cases
that congest the system, the result is clear-the EEOC is not serving the
parties well. This means that employee and employer rights are not being
safeguarded adequately. In fact, the EEOC is not resolving claims.
Instead, the job of making sure that discrimination laws are enforced at the
workplace is left to the courts, or more realistically, to the plaintiffs'
lawyers who decide which plaintiffs' cases to accept and which to turn
away." However, the federal courts and plaintiffs' lawyers are notproviding justice either.
E. A Federal Court Is Not a Viable Avenue for Most Plaintiffs
In order to file a claim in federal court, an employee must, for all
intents and purposes, retain competent counsel. Because few employees
can afford an attorney's hourly rate, most plaintiffs seek lawyers who work
on a contingency basis. No scholarly work examines how plaintiffs'
lawyers decide to take and manage employment discrimination cases.
There are, however, studies on how personal injury lawyers operate
contingency practices. Below we discuss the principles by which personal
administrative defect, it can be inferred that the EEOC is essentially harming plaintiffs with
otherwise actionable claims.
86. See, e.g., Martel v. County of Los Angeles, 56 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 1995).
87. Peter Albrecht referred to the EEOC as a "procedural hoop that plaintiffs have to jump
through to adjudicate their claims." Ritter & Albrecht, supra note 39. According to Albrecht,
the EEOC provides little or no benefit for plaintiffs with "B" cases. See id. Instead, the agency
simply increases the amount of time it takes to get relief. See id.
88. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers As Gatekeepers in the American
Civil Justice System, JUDICATURE, July-Aug. 1997, at 22, 22-29 [hereinafter Kritzer,
Gatekeepers].
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injury attorneys operate and explain why some of these principles apply to
discrimination lawyers and why some do not.
Contingency attorneys manage a caseload as if it were a portfolio."
Lawyers minimize exposure to risk by carefully selecting the cases they
take, accepting cases with amenable facts even if the potential return is
low, taking a mix of cases, or limiting the amount of time devoted to a
given case." Lawyers often develop reputations for the way they opt to
manage caseloads. Selective plaintiffs' lawyers will signal employers that
their clients' cases have merit and that they are prepared to litigate.9'
Nonselective attorneys signal that they are looking for settlement.
92
Regardless of which approach is taken, one thing remains clear-attorneys
are rational actors who will not take cases unless they believe in their
ultimate profitability.93
In theory, the EEOC's resolution of a charge should signal plaintiffs'
lawyers whether a case would be profitable. A no-cause finding should
mean that the case has no merit. A cause finding should imply that the case
is worth pursuing. Because the statute provides attorneys' fees for the
prevailing plaintiff, an attorney has an incentive to take a "cause case" even
if there are low damages. Conversely, attorneys should not pursue cases in
which there has been a no-cause finding, regardless of the amount of
potential damages. This theory is quite appropriate. The EEOC determines
the merits of the claim, and attorneys file lawsuits only if the case is
meritorious. By dismissing the overwhelming majority of cases without
regard to the merits of these cases, the EEOC has created a perception
among plaintiffs' lawyers that the results of the investigations are
meaningless. Consequently, a no-cause finding is not a signal to plaintiffs'
lawyers because the EEOC does not provide relevant information.94
Attorneys, therefore, base their determinations on profitability, and thus
their ultimate decision to take a given plaintiff's case, on the limited
information available to them.
F. How Lawyers Select Plaintiffs' Claims
When working on a contingency basis, lawyers desire to earn more for
89. See HERBERT M. KRrrZER, RHETORIC AND REALITY... UsEs AND ABUsES...
CONTINGENCIES AND CERTAINTIES: THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT FEE IN OPERATION 89 (Inst for
Legal Studies, Working Paper No. DPRP 12-2, 1996) [hereinafter KRrrZER, RHETORIC AND
REAmr].
90. Seeid. at91.
91. SeeicL at 90.
92. See id.
93. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Investing in Cases: Can You Profit from Contingency Fee
Work?, WIS. LAW., Aug. 1997, at 10 [hereinafter Kritzer, Investing in Cases].
94. See Kritzer, Gatekeepers, supra note 88, at 22-29.
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their time than they would if they were charging by the hour for their
services. 9 Contingency lawyers need to exceed their hourly rates in cases
in which they are successful in order to make up for the lost time in the
cases that yield little or no reward. The most effective way for lawyers to
profit from a contingency practice is to avoid trial and settle the vast
majority of cases. 96 In fact, in some circumstances, it makes sense for
lawyers to push clients to settle even if the client would receive a greater
return at trial.97 A marginal increase in the attorney's fee is not worth the
exponential increase in the amount of time it will take to bring a case to
trial."
For our discussion, it is important to note the differences in personal
injury and discrimination law. Personal injury lawyers often sue insurance
companies. The cases typically involve unlimited damages but do not
permit judges to order defendants to pay the prevailing plaintiffs
attorneys' fees-an arrangement referred to as "fee shifting." The
insurance companies operate like plaintiffs' lawyers; they have portfolios
of cases and manage risk." Simply put, insurance companies are in the
business of defending lawsuits. Employers are not in the business of
defending discrimination cases. Moreover, employers forced to defend
against charges such as racism, sexism, or worse, may feel the need for
moral vindication or exculpation. In addition, employers, unlike insurance
companies, fear the bad publicity of a trial. The damages in discrimination
cases are capped under federal law, but there is fee shifting."°  These
critical differences make it difficult to model how plaintiffs' lawyers select
discrimination cases based on research of personal injury lawyers' decision
making.
Because of the differences between personal injury and discrimination
cases, we propose that discrimination attorneys may bring a different set of
questions into the case-screening process. We recognize that there is no
empirical support for this theory, but it is useful when addressing the
question of whether arbitration will increase or decrease the chances of a
discrimination plaintiff obtaining representation. Inherent in this
discussion is the issue of whether legislators should consider the economics
of the contingency practice in determining who can and who cannot work
free from discrimination and harassment.
95. See Kritzer, Investing in Cases, supra note 93, at 10.
96. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement
Expectations and Settlement Realities (visited Feb. 26, 1999)
<http://www.polsci.wisc.edu/-kritzer/contfee\settle.htm> [hereinafter Kritzer, Settlement
Expectations].
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See KRrrZER, RHETORICAND REALrrY, supra note 89, at 92.
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1998).
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We propose that there are three questions that a lawyer should
consider in deciding whether to take or reject a plaintiff's case. The
questions are as follows: (1) Are the merits of the case so strong or so weak
that the claim can be accepted or rejected without further inquiry? (2) Is
the case one that is easily settle-able? (3) Is the case one that is winnable
in court?
In cases in which there is solid evidence that an employee has been the
victim of discrimination, plaintiffs' lawyers should base their decisions to
take cases on their merits. In contrast, the merits of some cases are so
tenuous that the plaintiff would be unable to make a prima facie case.'
Such weak-merit cases, like the strong-merit cases, provide easy decisions
for attorneys. In most situations, however, the facts are less clear, and a
finding of liability is not a forgone conclusion. In these instances,
plaintiffs' attorneys should determine the profitability of the case by
examining potential damages, potential costs, and the defendant's ability
and willingness to pay. Juries award large damages only when the
employee is a high wage earner, the former employee has been
unemployed for an extended duration, or the employer's conduct was so
egregious as to warrant punitive damages."n Ability to pay is obviously
based on the financial condition of the employer. Willingness to pay is
generally determined on an employer-by-employer basis. Large employers
may be less likely to settle than smaller employers for two reasons. First,
large employers have the resources to hold out longer than smaller
employers do. As such, a large employer is unlikely to equate the threat of
litigation with the threat of bankruptcy. Second, larger employers, who are
101. Such cases include instances when the plaintiff is not in a protected class, or when the
plaintiff is in a protected class but the workforce is so homogenous that discrimination is
improbable (for example, a Mexican worker wanting to sue for discrimination when he was
fired from a workplace where every other worker was Mexican as well), or when the alleged
defendant is clearly not an "employer" under the statute. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1994).
102. The fact that back pay awards are equal to wages ('W") multiplied by the time
unemployed subject to a reasonable duty to mitigate such loses ("D"), or (W)(D), reveals an
underlying problem with discrimination litigation that has long been recognized and was one of
the motivating factors in Congress's decision to create the EEOC. Absent some intervention,
governmental or otherwise, when lawyers decide which plaintiffs' cases to accept, low wage
earners tend to be turned down more frequently because they are less likely to be profitable as
back pay is almost always the substantial part of the award. The EEOC was created so that Title
VII would not be a right reserved for the well off.
David Rose explains that since its creation, the EEOC has brought a
disproportionately high percentage of age discrimination cases primarily because older
plaintiffs tend to have significantly higher incomes, holding all else constant. See David L.
Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity
Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1159 (1989); see also Selmi, supra note 38, at
17 n.71 (noting that "[b]etween 1972 and 1987, 10.3% of all employment discrimination
cases filed in federal court were filed under the ADEA").
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susceptible to multiple claims, may have policies against settling in order to
avoid the de facto severance problem. Alternatively, any employer, large
or small, that fears the bad publicity inherently associated with a
discrimination trial may be litigation averse. A rational plaintiff's lawyer
will therefore take a case with dubious or questionable merit only when the
potential damages (as measured in part by the depth of the defendant's
pockets) are greater than the potential costs associated with the case. 3
Potential costs come in two forms. The first cost is monetary. The
attorney must advance the client the costs associated with litigation,
including filing fees, deposition transcripts, photocopies, and experts. The
attorney is often unable, or unwilling, to cover these costs with the
knowledge that remuneration will occur only in the case of a victory in
court. It is one thing to work for free; paying to work is another matter.
The second cost, based on our experiences before federal court judges,
is lost credibility before the federal bench. Some judges have little or no
patience for lawyers who bring fees cases into court. A fees case is a
lawsuit in which the recoverable damages are so low that the attorneys'
fees become the driving force in the case. Such a case often results when
the plaintiff is a low wage earner. An attorney may logically refrain from
taking these cases due to the hostility that judges have toward those who
litigate instead of settling low damage cases. A plaintiffs attorney does
not want to get a reputation as one who litigates fees cases.' Additionally,
plaintiffs' lawyers will not exceed their normal hourly rates by taking fees
cases to trial, and as discussed above, this is the goal for lawyers working
on a contingency basis."5
These actual and potential costs should convince plaintiffs' lawyers
either to refuse to take or not actively pursue cases involving low wage
earners unless the employer's liability is so clear to the lawyer, the defense,
and the court that punitive and compensatory damages are available.'O
103. In evaluating attorneys' decision making with regard to accepting or rejecting
settlement offers, Korobkin and Guthrie found that lawyers were just as likely as clients to act
based on irrational factors. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEx. L. REv. 77, 79-81 (1997). Thus,
while models of lawyers' decision making based on strictly rational and objectively
mathematical terms such as the one presented infra note 108 are quite useful for assisting
attorneys in determining how they should decide which cases to accept or reject (indeed, such
models may prove exceptionally useful given the human proclivity to short cut such decision
making with instinct and gut reaction), it would be misleading and presumptuous to purport that
such a model explains how attorneys actually do decide which cases to accept or reject without
any empirical evidence in support of such claims.
104. See Ritter & Albrecht, supra note 39.
105. See discussion supra Part I.E.
106. There is a conceivable exception to the general trend of fees cases being shunned by
federal court judges. Attorneys' fees can be potentially exorbitant and thereby carry great
deterrent effect In some instances, judges will permit and even encourage fees cases in order to
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This harsh reality results in the unlikelihood of low wage earners ever
seeing the inside of a courtroom. The only justice they receive comes in
the form of a cash award designed to make them disappear silently. We
emphasize the word silently because the majority of cases settle without
creating precedent or publicity.' 7 The right to a trial in federal court is, in
reality, limited to high wage earners and those who have strong evidence of
clear violations of the law. 03
send a deterrent message to other employers or to penalize a particular employer when its
conduct may have been reprehensible, egregious, or willful. See, for example, Hard Rock Cafij
Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992), in which the court
awarded Hard Rock a mere $120 in damages and nearly 20 times that amount in attorneys' fees
due to a flea market owner's willful trademark infringement of Hard Rock's licensed trademark.
The Lanham Act provides for such damages because, otherwise, small but willful trademark
infringements would go unpunished. Similarly, in employment discrimination suits, courts may
be apt to permit fees cases in certain limited contexts where willfully discriminatory employers
would otherwise go unpunished.
107. As explained infra, this reality must be remembered when addressing the argument that
mandatory arbitration retards the development of legal precedent as compared to its
development in the federal courts.
108. In an attempt to reduce a plaintiffs' attorney's decision making process to a coherent
and sound model A la Learned Hand's famous B > PL formula, see generally United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), we quickly discovered that a simple
expectancy-based model would be inaccurate and unrealistic.
There has been at least one other attempt to algebraically model an employment
discrimination lawyer's decision making. Michael Selmi has attempted to do so with two
equations. See Selmi, supra note 38, at 30. One indicates that a lawyer will choose to take
a case if the expected return of winning is greater than the expected loss associated with
failed litigation, ("p(wD) + p subl (x) > (1-p)Cp"). See id. Selmi measures expected return
as the probability of winning multiplied by the expected compensation of back pay and
other damages. See id. The second formula indicates that attorneys take cases when the
expected recoverable legal fees are greater than the expected costs incurred by taking the
case ("p(F) > (1-p)Cp"). See id. Selmi writes that "the ability to obtain fees from the
defendant suggests that the most attractive case for an attorney may have little to do with
damages." Id. at 31. The formulae and the conclusion drawn from them are flawed for five
reasons. First, Selmi neglects to consider attorneys' reluctance to take fees cases. See id.;
see also supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. Second, Selmi's model represents a
long-run probabilistic representation of how attorneys should think if they wanted to
maximize profits and were able to avoid the inescapable and myopic view of potential
clients that attorneys generally possess. The model, however, does not represent the way
that attorneys actually decide to take cases. For example, according to Selmi's model, an
attorney will take a case where the chances of losing are 80%, the costs of litigating are only
$1,000, the chance of winning is 20%, and the potential damages are $30,000! The short-
run opportunity costs involved are not factored in so that even if, in the long-run, the lawyer
maximizes his profits by this model, in the short run, he would never take a case with an
80% chance of losing because the opportunity costs of taking such a case are likely to be
great. Third, Selmi's model does not account for the fact that a lawyer working on a
contingency basis weighs not the total damages awardable to the plaintiff against the
potential costs associated with taking the case, but rather, the contingency based percentage
of potential damages. In the above scenario, for example, the attorney is not concerned with
the amount 0.20 x $30,000, but rather 0.20 x $30,000 x 0.33 (when his contingent rate is
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33%). Fourth, breaking up the equations into an attorney's concern with recovering
damages and her ability to recover her fees is unrealistic. These considerations are
intertwined. Finally, Selmi's model does not account for the distinction between a lawyer
who takes quick, settle-able cases with possibly little chance of winning on the merits or
going to court, and a lawyer who takes cases and pursues them vigorously to the bitter end.
A pathway model with some expectancy theory built in is more suitable to this type of
decision making. The following is a five-step model of how a rational plaintiff's attorney
would decide to take a plaintiff's case or not:
Step 1:
Are the merits of the case very strong, very weak, or somewhere in the middle? As
mentioned above, this threshold assessment of the merits of a plaintiff's case can sway an
attorney to accept or reject a plaintiff regardless of the amount of potential damages.
Attorneys are relatively accurate assessors of the merits of cases. See Kevin M. Clermont &
John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529, 561-62
(1978). But see Robert A. Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary
Inquiry, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 48 (1994).
Step 2:
For cases whose merits are somewhere in the middle, is the case easily settle-able?
(For example, does the plaintiff's case offer a sufficiently strong threat of litigation?) A
lawyer's decision to take a case based on settle-ability can be modeled as follows:
Ps(C)(dam) > W(OC) + (CS)
"Ps" is the probability of settlement. Step 3 describes how lawyers determine "Ps."
"C" is the lawyer's contingency percentage.
"dam" represents the damages the plaintiff is justified in claiming. This variable at its
most basic form is simply back pay, which is easily calculated. See supra note 102. In
addition to back pay, "dam" may include punitive damages and other compensatory
damages. One survey of 321 NELA member lawyers and 330 ABA member attorneys
"regularly representing employees in discrimination disputes" (80% to 100% of the firm's
practice consisting of employment law issues) revealed that lawyers required minimum
provable damages of $60,000 to $65,000 in order to accept a plaintiff's case. See William
M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really Does Happen?
What Really Should Happen?, Disp. REsOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40, 43-44.
"W(OC)" is the weighted consideration of opportunity costs involved in taking this
particular plaintiff's case. This is essentially a variable expressing the value of the lawyer's
time. Because individual assessments of opportunity costs vary across many variables,
different lawyers will afford such costs different weights. For instance, a large plaintiffs'
firm would weigh its opportunity cost of taking any given case differently than a solo
practitioner struggling to stay out of the red.
"CS" is the out-of-pocket cost of settling. This includes wages paid to associates and
support staff, the cost of office supplies, photocopies, traveling, and other related expenses.
The right side of this equation is purposely void of any "1-Ps" type variable because even if
the case is not settle-able, it may still be litigation-worthy. It should also be noted that "CS"
does not include costs incurred by the lawyer in initially determining whether the case has
any merit because such costs are incurred regardless of whether the lawyer takes the case.
Step 3:
The probability of settlement ("Ps") can be expressed as a function of the probability
of winning at trial ('Pw"), the amount of the potential damages ("dam") (the greater the
amount of potential damages, the more likely the defendant will settle), the strength of the
merits ("M") (the stronger the merits, the more likely the defendant will settle), and the
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defendant's ability and willingness to pay ("D"). Algebraically represented:
Ps = f (Pw, dam, M, D)
Step 4:
Is the case winnable through litigation itself? If so, the case is attractive to plaintiffs'
lawyers willing to pursue cases vigorously even if -they are not quickly settle-able. This
question can be expressed by the following equation:
Pw(Cm)(dam) + Pw(fee) > (1 - Pw)(CL) + W(OC)
"Pw" is the probability of winning at trial-this is generally a function of the strengths
of the merits, the credibility of the witnesses, the lawyers' confidence in their litigation
skills relative to those of the defendant's attorneys, knowledge of the judge, and other
factors.
"Cm" is the modified contingency percentage of the potential winnings, which is
generally less than the contingency percentage for settled cases. For instance, it is common
for attorneys to offer clients a contingency rate of 30% if the case settles and only 20% if the
case is won at trial.
"fee" is the legal fees recoverable if the plaintiff wins. "dam" is the same as "dam" in
the above equations. "CL" is the cost of litigation including costs incurred in preparation
for litigation. "W(OC)" is the weighted opportunity cost of taking the case, as noted above.
"CL" and "W(OC)" have the potential of being exceptionally large. In firms where
associates and paralegals do most of the trial-preparation, hourly wages, or CL, is probably
the large part of the right side of the equation. Solo practitioners probably have larger
W(OC)s.
Step 5:
Due to the potential concern of losing credibility before the bench by bringing
numerous fees cases, lawyers calculate the ratio of their hourly wage-based assessment of
their fees to the awardable damages to determine whether to take the case. This is one area
where the distinction between lawyers looking for quickly settle-able cases and lawyers
willing to vigorously pursue every case is highly relevant. Attorneys tend to take cases in
which this ratio is less than some constant ("K") that varies across jurisdictions and
attorneys:
Fee< K
dam
To illustrate how these five steps may be used to guide a lawyer's decision to take or
turn down a discrimination plaintiff, assume the following hypothetical facts. (The
hypothetical situation involves a discharged plaintiff because the overwhelming majority of
cases filed in the past five years have been discharge cases. The model, however, functions
for any type of case.)
The employer manufactures component parts for several large automobile companies.
The plaintiff, a riveter who earned $500 per week for two years, is a member of a protected
class. She left work without giving any notice of her intention to return and was replaced
after four days. She alleges that she was constructively discharged due to unlawful
discrimination. She further claims that her supervisor had been looking for an excuse to fire
her for some time and grasped the opportunity created by her unexplained disappearance.
The plaintiff claims to have overheard the supervisor making racist and sexist comments,
specifically mentioning her by name. Some preliminary investigation reveals that the
employer, a large company with deep pockets and vast legal resources at its disposal, stands
firmly behind the plaintiff's supervisor who claims that the employee was a poor worker and
had been known to skip work frequently in the past. Unfortunately for the employer, the
plaintiff was never warned or disciplined for her past infractions. In fact, she received
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When plaintiffs' lawyers act as gatekeepers for employment
discrimination claims (and, as illustrated above, the EEOC has been
passing the job of gatekeeper to the plaintiffs' bar due to its ineffective
signaling), low wage-earning plaintiffs with potentially viable, but not
egregious, claims may remain without a remedy. Moreover, large
employers are able to pay minimum sums that allow them to continue
practicing discrimination. Even plaintiffs who do see the inside of a
courtroom are not really well off. Federal litigation is a heart-wrenching
strong performance evaluations. She has been unemployed for 20 weeks.
Assuming the case survives step 1, and the case has some merit, the lawyer will then
apply step 2 to determine if the case will be quickly profitable due to its settle-ability. The
case probably has a low probability of settlement ("Ps") according to step 3. The
probability of winning at trial is low (assume for the moment 50%), the damages are
relatively small ($10,000), the merits are in the middle, and the determinative factor is the
employer's recalcitrance to settle. The employer has vast legal resources specifically for the
purpose of fighting vigorously to avoid the de facto severance problem so the employer is
highly adverse to settlement. Because the defendant is a component parts manufacturer, the
fear of bad publicity does not increase the "Ps." With a low "Ps," a typical contingency rate
of 33%, and damages of $10,000, a lawyer only looking at steps 1-3 (the type of lawyer
looking only for a quick settlement) will find that the chances of settling are not good and
that the $3300 is not an attractive amount of damages. A firm looking for settlement money
would be unlikely to take this case due to the costs of further investigation, including
interviewing witnesses and negotiating with the employer. Furthermore, the case compares
poorly with other potentially profit-making endeavors. Thus, this plaintiff would not be
able to obtain representation from a large percentage of plaintiffs' law firms.
The next question is whether the firm would be willing to pursue this claim in court
even if it is not settle-able. With an assumed probability of winning in court of 50%, a
modified contingency rate of 20%, the same potential damage award, and a fee amount
equal to $100,000, the left side of the equation for step 4 would look like this:
(0.5)(0.20)($10,000) + (0.5)($100,000) or $51,000. This number is compared with the right
side of the equation which would look like this: (0.5)($10,000 out-of-pocket expenses) +
($82,500 opportunity costs) or $87,500. Because the costs ($87,500) outweigh the potential
benefits ($51,000), the firm should not take this case.
We base our estimates of cost on a number of factors. The $100,000 in fees and the
$10,000 in out-of-pocket expenses is based on an approximation of the costs and fees the
plaintiffs' attorneys accrued in Austin v. Cornell University, 891 F. Supp. 740 (N.D.N.Y.
1995), a garden variety age discrimination case. The $82,500 in opportunity cost is
estimated by multiplying 550 hours by $150, an estimated amount at which other clients
could have been billed. As attorneys' fees were estimated at $100,000, and the billable rate
is $150, the law firm is putting in approximately 666 hours on the case. We chose $150 per
hour because this is the default amount that the Northern District of New York awards in
attorneys' fees absent a showing that the firm commands a higher billable rate. In
determining the estimated amount at which other clients could have been billed, we
intentionally reduced the number of replaceable billable hours from 666 to 550 because it is
possible that not every hour of work time needed to be devoted to the plaintiffs claim
would be usable towards alternative projects. Note that punitive damages were not factored
into the equation because the conduct in the hypothetical was not egregious enough to merit
such an award. Additionally, the fee/"dam" ratio of 10-to-i might be larger than some "K"
so that step 5 would further discourage lawyers from taking the case before the federal
bench.
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marathon that no one enjoys and many people simply cannot tolerate."°
Litigation, which on the average takes two-and-a-half years to resolve, can
last for more than ten years.
The public aspect of litigation is potentially detrimental to employees
and employers alike. Employer-defendants tear voraciously at the
character and integrity of employee-plaintiffs during long, arduous trials.
Litigation leaves ample public record not only of the employee's
accusations but also of the employer's. Following the trial, employees may
be blacklisted, disrespected, and distrusted when they attempt to return to
work."' Employers face the possibility of baseless accusations shattering
their reputations that may have taken years to develop.
Because of the time, money, and other problems associated with the
EEOC and federal litigation of discrimination claims, when discussing the
current enforcement system, Judge James Moran, the chief judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, the federal district court that hears more
discrimination claims than any other district in the country, stated, "It's a
bad system for the employer, it's a bad system for the employee.""' In
practice, however, we propose that the current system of resolving cases
through the EEOC and federal litigation is not bad for all employers and
employees. Instead, it hurts only the good actors: employees with
legitimate claims and employers falsely accused of discrimination. At the
same time, the system benefits the bad actors: employers who discriminate
and employees who file frivolous claims. Bad actor employers and
employees use the costs and delays of the system to their benefit. Bad
actor employers use litigation to wear down employees with delays and
discovery costs. Bad actor employees use the threat of the cost of defense
to extort employers into paying de facto severance. Investigators and
lawyers facilitate the bad actors' actions by pushing settlements. They
encourage: (1) innocent employers to settle frivolous cases by threatening
them with the costs of investigation and litigation; and (2) employees with
meritorious cases to settle by threatening them with delays, the probability
of a no-cause finding, and the financial and emotional costs of litigation.
Therefore, under the current system, innocent employers are forced to
109. See Amy Saltzman, Life After the Lawsuit, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 19, 1996,
at 57 (reporting on the negative post-trial experiences of plaintiff- victors in Title VII lawsuits,
including Ann Hopkins of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
110. While the average time frame varies slightly across jurisdictions, the average remains
close to two or three years. See Lois A. Baar & Michael A. Zody, Resolution Conferences
Conducted by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division: The Elements of a Successful
Administrative Mediation Program, 21 J. CONTEMP. L. 21, 28 (1995); Richard D. Wilkins,
Arbitrate or Out!, CENT. N.Y. Bus. J, Feb. 5, 1996, at 1 (noting that the median time between
the date a lawsuit is filed and the commencement of a civil trial is 2.5 years).
111. See Saltzman, supra note 109, at 57.
112. Eisler, supra note 20, at 1A.
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pay damages, however small, to former employees who slandered them by
calling them discriminators, whereas employees with legitimate claims do
not receive redress or even their day in court. Conversely, guilty
employers get off for a fraction of the potential damages, and employees
who filed frivolous claims receive de facto severance. Because employers
are exposed to high defense costs, and employees' claims are often neither
timely nor fairly investigated, the current system is failing in its mission.
Thus, both employees and employers would be better served by an
alternative to the federal courts.
G. Arbitration
Because it is faster and less expensive, arbitration is arguably more
accessible to employees. Arbitration takes an average of 264 days from
filing to disposition."3 Lawyers do not need to commit nearly as much time
to arbitration as they must to the same set of facts raised in federal court.
This reduction in time should have a drastic effect on the decision of a
plaintiffs' lawyer to take a case. The reduced costs associated with
preparing and arbitrating a dispute exponentially deflate the right side of
the equation expressed in step four in Note 108."' Holding all else constant
(the merits, plaintiff, defendant, and most importantly, damages), lawyers
should be more likely to accept a Title VII arbitration-bound plaintiff than
a litigation-bound plaintiff. Furthermore, lawyers can take a chance on a
fees case because arbitration is a relatively quick process, arbitrators are
not hostile to hearing such a case (unlike federal court justices) and
arbitrators have no overcrowded docket to worry about."5
Most plaintiffs' lawyers, however, oppose arbitration. While the
reasons cited usually focus on the perceived lack of fairness and lack of
choice,"6 there is a more practical reason for this opposition. Plaintiffs'
113. See Employers Reluctant to Embrace Mandatory Arbitration, Survey Finds, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 84, at A-14 (Apr. 30, 1992) (this figure is based on AAA's handling of 562
cases between employers and individual employees in 1991); see also Beth A. Rowe, Binding
Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Opposing Pre-Dispute Agreements, 27 U. TOL. L. REV.
921, 934 (1996) (citing a finding by the Civil Justice Institute of the Rand Corporation that the
average arbitration decision is reached in approximately 8.6 months (262 days)); Perspective:
ADR Techniques Gaining Favor in Non-Traditional Settings, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at
C-1 (Mar. 15, 1993) (Stephen Hirschfeld of McKenna & Cuneo, a San Francisco-based law
firm, stated that the "arbitration process takes, on average, one or two days and can be complete
within about six months from the time of the incident. ... This is in contrast to the average
wrongful discharge case, which may last from two to five years-or longer.").
114. The variable "CL" would be much less on the average for arbitratable cases as opposed
to non-arbitrable ones. See discussion supra note 108.
115. Therefore, the constant, "K", in step five of a lawyer's decision to take a plaintiff's
case, is lowered. See id.
116. See Vladeck, supra note 16, at 7.
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lawyers maximize their earnings when they settle cases for high damages
with little time invested.1 7  By reducing the likelihood of settling,
arbitration makes cases less attractive to profit-maximizing plaintiffs'
lawyers. A lawyer who takes an arbitration case knows that it is likely that
the case will be adjudicated. This increases the time it takes to obtain
payment and, as a result, reduces the lawyer's hourly rate.
For employers, the reduced cost, increased speed, private nature, and
elimination of juries make arbitration an attractive option. Employers who
are litigation-averse (because of fears of costs, bad publicity, or both)
utilize arbitration to avoid de facto severance. This does not mean,
however, that arbitration is perfect. Indeed, it is not. As discussed below,
it is not entirely clear what criteria should be used to determine the fairness
of an arbitration policy. However, despite this and other concerns,
arbitration offers a marked improvement over the existing adjudication
process.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL STATUS OF ARBITRATION
A. In Most Jurisdictions, Employers Can Require Employees to Arbitrate
Discrimination Claims
The law regarding whether an arbitration clause precludes the judicial
adjudication of statutorily created rights (for example, discrimination,
wage, and hour claims) is both unsettled and rapidly evolving. In most
jurisdictions, a compulsory arbitration policy prevents employees from
bringing a discrimination lawsuit into federal court."8 In the Ninth Circuit,
however, Title VII and ADA cases cannot be subject to mandatory
arbitration agreements."9 In order to explain the specifics of the law, it is
necessary to examine the two leading Supreme Court decisions and two
leading circuit court opinions.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,'" the United States Supreme
Court held that an adverse arbitration decision does not bar an employee
covered by a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration clause
from litigating a Title VII discrimination case in federal court.'' The lower
courts extended this holding to the nonunion setting, and thus, until the
Gilmer v. Interstate-Johnson Lane Corp.'22 decision, compulsory arbitration
117. See Kritzer, Investing in Cases, supra note 93, at 10.
118. See cases cited supra note 6.
119. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
120. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
121. Seeid. at 59-60.
122. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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clauses could not prevent employees from litigating any right created by
discrimination statutes.
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court distinguished its Gardner-Denver
decision and held that a compulsory arbitration clause could prevent
nonunion employees from filing age discrimination claims in federal
court." The plaintiff in the case, Robert Gilmer (a registered securities
representative), signed the New York Stock Exchange's securities
registration application in order to gain employment.2 4 The application
contained a compulsory arbitration clause.'2 When he was subsequently
terminated from his position with his employer, the plaintiff filed an ADEA
lawsuit in federal court.'2 The Gilmer Court held that the arbitration clause
was enforceable and thus barred the plaintiff from pursuing his federal
court claim. 7 Following the Gilmer decision, lower courts extended the
holding to other alleged violations of Title VI.'i
The Gilmer Court distinguished the Gardner-Denver holding on three
grounds. First, because a labor arbitrator's role is limited to enforcing the
parties' collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator in Gardner-Denver
did not have the authority to determine whether the ADEA had been
violated. 9 Second, the Gardner-Denver arbitrator's "task is to effectuate
the intent of the parties" even if these interests conflict with the employee's
statutory rights.' Finally, the arbitration clause in Gilmer, unlike that in
Gardner-Denver, was enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), 3' a statute passed in 1925. Interpretation of the scope and
123. See id. at 35.
124. See id. at 23.
125. The application provides that the potential employee agrees to "arbitrate any dispute,
claim or controversy" arising between the applicant and the employer "that is required to be
arbitrated under the rules, constitutions or by-laws of the organizations" with which the
applicant registers. Id. Gilmer had registered with the New York Stock Exchange, which has a
rule providing for arbitration of "any controversy between a registered representative and any
member or member organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment
of such registered representative." Id
126. See id at 23-24.
127. See id. at 35.
128. See cases cited supra note 6.
129. According to the Court, the Gardner-Denver line of cases is distinguishable from
Gilmer for several reasons:
First, those cases did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement
to arbitrate statutory claims [, meaning that] the arbitration in those cases
understandably was not held to preclude subsequent statutory actions. Second,
because the arbitration in those cases occurred in the context of a collective-
bargaining agreement, unions represented the claimants in the arbitration
proceedings.... Finally, those cases were not decided under the FAA.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
130. 415 U.S. at 53.
131. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). Originally called the United States Arbitration Act, the
102 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 2:1
applicability of both the FAA and the 1991 Act represents the core of the
debate over the legality of mandatory arbitration.
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
The current split in the circuits over the lawfulness of mandatory
arbitration focuses on language set forth in the 1991 Act. Specifically,
section 118 of the 1991 Act provides that, "[w]here appropriate and to the
extent authorized by law, the use of alternative dispute resolution,
including.., arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under
[Title VII and the ADA].' 32 In Duffield, the Ninth Circuit held that this
language embodies a congressional intent to prohibit the use of pre-dispute
agreements by employers to mandate that employees arbitrate statutory
claims,' 33 while in Seus, the Third Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion.'TM Below we examine the reasoning of both courts.
C. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that Duffield, as plaintiff, bore the
burden of proving Congress's intent to preclude judicial forum waivers for
Title VII claims.'35 Such intention, according to the court, will be
discoverable in the text of the act at issue, its legislative history, or by the
fact that there is an inherent conflict between arbitration and the act's
underlying purposes.'36 The court explained the burden on the plaintiff to
FAA was modeled after New York State's Arbitration Act of 1920. See IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMEuCAN ARBrIRATION LAW 181 n.2 (1992). President Coolidge signed the federal act into
law on February 12, 1925. See id. at 101. For an account of the history of federal arbitration
law, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Issues in Federal-State Relations Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 61, 73-79 (1985); Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's
Interstate Commerce Requirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HoFSTRA L. REV.
385, 388-89 (1992).
132. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991) (codified in scattered sections
of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
133. See 144 F.3d 1182,1185 (9thCir. 1998).
134. See 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 1998).
135. The Duffield court writes:
As Gilmer pointed out, the standard governing the enforceability of arbitration
agreements under the FAA is well established. "Having made the bargain to
arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue." The burden, therefore, is on Duffield to demonstrate that "Congress
intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for [Title VII] claims" in the
manner mandated by Form U-4.
144 F.3d at 1190; see also cases cited supra note 3.
136. The court cites Gilmer. "If such an intention exists, it will be discoverable in the text of
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prove congressional intent as follows: "In the post-Gilmer era, if courts are
to hold that an act precludes arbitration of claims to which it gives rise, a
more concrete showing is required, including a scrupulous examination of
Congress' actions and intent."'37
The implication ostensibly created by the "concrete showing"
requirement is that proving congressional intent must not be based on
ambiguous, nebulous, non-concrete information. This conforms with the
treatment at least one other court has given to plaintiffs yoked with the
heavy evidentiary burden of proving congressional intent."'
With this as a starting point, the Duffield court first implied that
section 118 was irrelevant by quoting Chief Judge Posner who referred to
section 118 as a "polite bow to the popularity of 'alternative dispute
resolution."" 39  Next, the court acknowledged that the meaning of the
statute was far from clear when it stated, "[u]pon a careful reading of § 118
in context, moreover, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the text of
the section is, at a minimum, ambiguous-and that, at a maximum, it
stands for a proposition that differs significantly from the one advanced by
[the defendant].""' 4 The fact that the Duffield court initially found section
118 ambiguous is not surprising. The Supreme Court 4' and several
commentators have remarked on the purposely ambiguous nature of several
parts of the 1991 Act.42 Professor Rebecca White commented that
"Congress was often purposefully ambiguous, essentially choosing not to
decide certain polarizing issues in order to pass a bill the President would
sign.,,143 According to Professor White, Congress chose to use language it
[the act at issue], its legislative history, or an 'inherent conflict' between arbitration and the
[Act's] underlying purposes." Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984)).
"[A]il presumptions used in interpreting statutes... may be overcome by specific language or
specific legislative history that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent." Block, 467 U.S. at
349.
137. 144 F.3d at 1189 (emphasis added).
138. See West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 18 (3d Cir. 1989) (writing
that the burden of proving congressional intent is "not easily satisfied").
139. Duffleld, 144 F.3d at 1191 (citing Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th
Cir. 1997)).
140. Il at 1193 (emphasis added). The defendant argued that section 118 permitted
mandatory arbitration. See id. at 1191.
141. See discussion infra notes 159-64 and accompanying text regarding Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
142. See, e.g., Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45
RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 924-25 (1993); Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the
Moral High Ground: The Conflict Between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991,46 RuTGERS L. REv. 1,238 (1993).
143. Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination
Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
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knew was susceptible to different interpretations because "[t]hese
ambiguities, as Congress necessarily recognized, essentially shifted the
responsibility for making employment discrimination policy from Congress
to either the judiciary or the EEOC."' 4  Considering the need for a
"concrete showing" of congressional intent, it is a mystery of textual
interpretation how the Ninth Circuit convinced itself that the admittedly
irrelevant and ambiguous "encouragement of arbitration" language used in
section 118 could be translated to mean "prohibit mandatory arbitration."'4
The Duffield court supports its conclusion by focusing on the phrases
"where appropriate" and "to the extent authorized by law."' 46 The court
presumes that the two qualifying terms "appropriate" and "to the extent
authorized by law" mean "separate and distinct limitations on the
conditions and circumstances under which the arbitration process may be
invoked to resolve Title VIIclaims."' 47
The court defines "where appropriate" as "where arbitration furthers
the purpose and objective of the Act-by affording victims of
discrimination an opportunity to present their claims in an alternative
forum, a forum that they find desirable-not by forcing an unwanted forum
upon them."'" There are three major flaws with this interpretation. First is
the obvious discrepancy between Congress's and the court's descriptions of
the objective of the Act. According to Congress, the Act has twin goals:
(1) to "restore... civil rights laws" by "overruling" a series of
1989 Supreme Court decisions that Congress thought represented
an unduly narrow and restrictive reading of Title VII, and (2) to
"strengthen" Title VII by making it easier to bring and to prove
law suits, and by increasing the available judicial remedies so
that plaintiffs could be fully compensated for injuries resulting
from discrimination.
41
The court fails to explain how it arrives at the conclusion that strengthening
Title VII so that it is easier to bring and prove lawsuits and increasing
51, 52 (1995).
144. Il at 70; see also Belton, supra note 142, at 925 ("[Tihe 1991 Act contains numerous
ambiguities and unresolved issues that have important consequences for determining the future
contours of the unfinished civil rights agenda for economic justice in the workplace."); Govan,
supra note 142, at 238 ("Congress purposely chose not to resolve or clarify some policy issues
and did not realize its use of language on other issues created latent ambiguities. Many
interpretive issues are to be resolved in the courts.").
145. See Duffleld, 144 F.3d at 1185.
146. Id. at 1193. This argument is mirrored by district courts that follow Duffield. See, e.g.,
Martens v. Smith Barney Inc., No. 96-Civ.-3779, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9226, at *30
(S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1998).
147. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193.
148. Id. at 1194.
149. Id. at 1191 (internal citations omitted) (citing H.R. REP. No. 40(1), at 30 (1991); H.R.
REP. No. 40(H1), at 1-4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,694-96).
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judicial remedies so that plaintiffs will be fully compensated: (1) conflicts
with mandatory arbitration, a system that reduces the barriers to
adjudication and provides the statutes new remedies, or (2) equals
"affording victims of discrimination an opportunity to present their claims
in an alternative forum, a forum that they find desirable-not by forcing an
unwanted forum upon them."' 50
The second flaw in the court's argument is the lack of both logical and
empirical bases for the presumption that when arbitration is compulsory, it
is necessarily undesirable for plaintiffs. The argument that simply because
something is mandatory, it is therefore necessarily undesirable, is in and of
itself logically incorrect. An analogous argument would be to say that
because wearing seat belts is mandatory, it follows that all drivers and
passengers in moving vehicles wish to be unbuckled. This is simply not
the case. Furthermore, the court gives not even a hint of empirical
evidence that arbitration is undesirable to a majority of employee-plaintiffs.
Instead, the court apparently relies on conjecture and the views of
plaintiffs, plaintiffs' lawyers, the EEOC, and other groups who have a
vested interest in perpetuating the status quo, regardless of its
shortcomings.
The third flaw with the court's argument centers around its
distinguishing of the different types of arbitration. Assuming arguendo that
arbitration is less desirable than litigation (a conclusion that we dispute but
is the basis for the court's decision), there is no logical reason for arguing
that certain types of arbitration are endorsed by Congress while others are
prohibited. Voluntary arbitration, which the Duffield court considers
"appropriate," and the other forms of ADR mentioned in section 118,'"' are
no more harmonious with the twin goals of the 1991 Act than mandatory
arbitration. Voluntary arbitration and the other forms of ADR listed in
section 118 certainly do not make it any easier to bring and prove lawsuits
than mandatory arbitration does. In addition, plaintiffs are no more likely
to be fully compensated under voluntary arbitration than they are under a
mandatory arbitration system. Both mandatory and voluntary arbitration
provide the parties with an inexpensive, confidential, and fast resolution.
In exchange for these "benefits," both types of arbitration suffer from the
same procedural shortcomings. Accordingly, there is no basis to argue that
mandatory arbitration violates the goals of the 1991 Act while voluntary
arbitration conforms to them.
The aforementioned arguments and their flaws present persuasive
reasons to discount the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section 118. Once
congressional intent could not be evinced from the actual text of the statute,
150. 1l at 1194.
151. These include mediation, fact-finding, and mini-trials, all of which, in general, have
fewer due process requirements than arbitration.
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the inquiry normally would stop there. Assuming arguendo, however, that
the naked language used in section 118 lends itself to the possibility of the
Ninth Circuit's creative reading, the plaintiff would have to use one of two
methods to prove that the statute, stating that it encourages arbitration,
actually evinces a clear congressional intent to prohibit mandatory
arbitration. The two methods for proving congressional intent are: (1)
examining legislative history, and (2) finding inherent conflict between
arbitration and the 1991 Act itself. The Duffield court does not address the
inherent conflict issue but, instead, relies on legislative history.
Duffield sets forth two legislative history arguments. First, the court
examined committee report statements in order to define section 118's
other qualifier, "to the extent authorized by law."'52 The court concluded
that this phrase refers to Gardner-Denver and not Gilmer because the
phrase "most likely codifies the 'law' as Congress understood it at the time
it either drafted or passed the provision."'53  The court points to the
following excerpt from the House Committee on Education and Labor's
report on H.R. 1, the bill that became the 1991 Act, to prove "dispositively"
that "encouraging arbitration" means "prohibiting mandatory arbitration":
The Committee emphasizes ... that the use of alternative dispute
mechanisms is... intended to supplement, not supplant, the
remedies provided by Title VII. Thus, for example, the
committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues
to arbitration, whether in the context of collective bargaining or
in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected person
from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title
VII. This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co.
The committee does not intend this section to be used to preclude
rights and remedies that would otherwise be available.'54
Second, the court points to the fact that Congress rejected a proposal
called "the Republican substitute," which encourages the use of ADR
mechanisms "in place of judicial resolution."'55  The court states that
"[s]uch a rule [encouraging mandatory arbitration] would fly in the face of
Supreme Court decisions holding that workers have the right to go to court,
rather than being forced into compulsory arbitration, to resolve important
statutory and constitutional rights, including equal opportunity rights.'
156
The congressional committee references Gardner-Denver for this last
152. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193.
153. Id. at 1194.
154. Id. at 1195-96 (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 97 (1991)) (internal citations
omitted).
155. Id at 1196 (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 104 (1991)).
156. Id.
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statement.' 7 From this, the Duffield court concludes that congressional
intent, frozen at the time that this statement was made, embodies the
holding in Gardner-Denver in spite of the fact that the 1991 Act was
passed six months after Gilmer was decided.'58
The Ninth Circuit's complete reliance on these two statements is
inappropriate because during the debates on the 1991 Act, members of
Congress made statements that may have expressed their personal opinions
but not necessarily the opinion of Congress collectively. In interpreting
section 102 of the 1991 Act, which addresses retroactive application, the
Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products'59 noted that statements
made on the floor of Congress and rejected drafts do not explain
ambiguous statutory language and are not definitive evidence of
congressional intent.'6 Instead, the Court explained that Congress left
certain parts of the 1991 Act intentionally vague, presumably to avoid
additional partisan conflicts and to get the bill passed.' The Court writes:
The 1991 bill as originally introduced in the House contained
explicit retroactivity provisions similar to those found in the 1990
bill. However, the Senate substitute that was agreed upon
omitted those explicit retroactivity provisions. The legislative
history discloses some frankly partisan statements about the
meaning of the final effective date language, but those statements
cannot plausibly be read as reflecting any general agreement.
The history reveals no evidence that Members believed that an
agreement had been tacitly struck on the controversial
retroactivity issue, and little to suggest that Congress understood
or intended the interplay of §§ 402(a), 402(b), and 109(c) to have
the decisive effect petitioner assigns them. Instead, the history of
the 1991 Act conveys the impression that legislators agreed to
disagree about whether and to what extent the Act would apply to
preenactment conduct. 62
The circumstances the Supreme Court discusses in Landgraf regarding
Congress' drafting of section 102 are remarkably parallel to the
circumstances surrounding the present debate over congressional intent
embodied in section 118. In Landgraf, alternative proposed language for
section 102 was rejected, just like the "Republican substitute" discussed
above regarding section 118. However, the Court recognized that:
The omission of the elaborate retroactivity provision of the 1990
157. See id. (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 36).
158. Seeid at 1196-97.
159. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
160. Seeid. at261-65.
161. See id
162. Id at 262 (emphasis added).
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bill-which was by no means the only source of political
controversy over that legislation-is not dispositive because it
does not tell us precisely where the compromise was struck in the
1991 Act. The Legislature might, for example, have settled in
1991 on a less expansive form of retroactivity that, unlike the
1990 bill, did not reach cases already finally decided.
16 1
As with the issue of retroactivity, it would be unwise to presume
congressional intent regarding arbitration from statements made about the
rejection of the "Republican substitute." The relevance of these statements
is overstated when they are viewed in a vacuum-without reference to the
political circumstances surrounding the passage of the 1991 Act.
Additionally, the Landgraf Court recognized the "frankly partisan
statements" included in the legislative history, but discounted their
significance because "the history of the 1991 Act conveys the impression
that legislators agreed to disagree about whether and to what extent the Act
would apply to preenactment conduct.""' So too, here, the statements
quoted by the Ninth Circuit do not necessarily convey any "concrete
showing" of congressional intent to preclude mandatory arbitration when
viewed in the context of Congress's desire to pass the 1991 Act into law
and avoid partisan controversy.
D. Seus v. John Nuveen & Co.
The Third Circuit in Seus v. John Nuveen & Co.'65 rejected the
Duffield court's analysis for two reasons: (1) the statute's plain language,
and (2) the timing of the enactment of the law.' 6 The Seus court held that
there is nothing in the plain language of the statute from which one can
infer congressional intent to prohibit mandatory arbitration.' 67 Moreover,
the Third Circuit explained that the term "to the extent authorized by law"
refers to the FAA, the statute which directly addresses arbitration, 68 and not
to either Gilmer or Gardner-Denver. If, however, the language does codify
any case law, Seus posited that Congress could not have intended to codify
Gardner-Denver.69
163. Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 262.
165. 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998).
166. See id. at 182-83.
167. The court writes: "no amount of commentary from individual legislators or committees
would justify a court in reaching the result the EEOC would have us reach." Id. at 182.
168. The view that the term "authorized by law" is a clear reference to the FAA is shared by
other academics. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 142, at 959-60 (stating that "[tihe most
appropriate source of authorization for arbitration, aside from collective bargaining sanctioned
by the National Labor Relations Act, is the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)").
169. See Seus, 146 F.3d at 183.
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As stated above, Congress passed the 1991 Act six months after the
Supreme Court decided Gilmer"7 According to the Seus Court, if section
118 were meant to codify any case law, it would refer to a case that the
Supreme Court had passed six months prior to enactment and not the case
law that had been rejected.' If Congress was referring either to the FAA
or to the Gilmer holding, which relies, in part, on the FAA, it is necessary
to examine the FAA.
E. The FAA Favors Arbitration
The FAA reflects a "liberal federal policy of favoring arbitration
agreements."'' At the time of its enactment, the courts generally distrusted
the arbitration process and thus, refused to enforce arbitration
agreements.'73 In response, the FAA provides procedures for issuing
subpoenas to witnesses,'74 and for the selection of arbitrators, 75 as well as
procedures and grounds for judicial enforcement, 76 modification,'77 and
vacation 7 1 of arbitration awards. Section 2 states that the FAA applies to
all "written provision[s] in any maritime transaction or a contract
170. See id. at 182.
171. Thecourtwrites:
Moreover, we find nothing in the legislative history suggesting that this
hortatory provision was intended to codify, and thus freeze, any particular view
of the case law. Finally, even if we were to accept "authorized by law" as
intended to codify case law, we would find the text incompatible with the notion
that the law codified was case law inconsistent with a Supreme Court case
decided six months before the passage of the Act.
l at 183. (emphasis added).
172. Gilmer v. Interstate-Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,25 (1991) (citing Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
173. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-85 (2d Cir.
1942) (offering an account of the history of judicial attitudes towards arbitration enforceability).
174. See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1994).
175. See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
176. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4,9 (1994).
177. See 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1994). Section 11 allows for modification or correction of an
arbitrator's award "[w]here there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident
material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award."
Id
178. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994). This section allows for a
United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made [to
vacate an arbitrator's award] where the award was produced by corruption,
fraud, or undue means, [w]here there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them, [w~here the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct
in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
1999]
110 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 2:1
evidencing a transaction involving commerce."19 Section 1 of the FAA,
however, excludes from coverage all "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce."' 80
In Gilmer, the arbitration clause in question was enforceable under the
FAA because the contract was not between the employee and his employer,
but rather between the employee and the New York Stock Exchange.81
This seemingly irrelevant distinction allowed the Court to justify the
enforcement of the arbitration clause as required by the FAA, and to pass
on two questions that would have provided a definitive answer to whether
Gilmer agreements are lawful: (1) Does the FAA exclude all employment
contracts from its jurisdiction? (Or, to put this another way, what is the
179. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (emphasis added). The full section reads as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
Id. The two verbs "evidencing" and "involving" have received much attention from both courts
and academics. See Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (interpreting
the two verbs broadly); Strickland, supra note 131, at 410-422.
180. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The statute provides:
"Maritime transactions", as herein defined, means charter parties, bills of lading
of water carriers, agreements relating to warfare, supplies furnished vessels or
repairs to vessels, collisions, or any other matters in foreign commerce which, if
the subject of controversy, would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction;
"commerce", as herein defined, means commerce among the several States or
with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of
Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such
Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia
and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.
181. See Gilmer v. InterstatefJohnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991). The Court
indicated that:
[t]he record before us does not show, and the parties do not contend, that
Gilmer's employment agreement with Interstate contained a written arbitration
clause. Rather, the arbitration clause at issue is in Gilmer's securities
registration application, which is a contract with the securities exchanges, not
with Interstate. The lower courts addressing the issue uniformly have
concluded that the exclusionary clause of § 1 of the FAA is inapplicable to
arbitration clauses contained in such registration applications.
IL But see id at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that section 1 excludes all employment
contracts).
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scope of section l's exclusionary language?); and (2) Does exclusion from
the FAA's coverage prevent a compulsory arbitration clause from being
enforceable? The Court's failure to answer these questions creates
confusion as to whether compulsory arbitration policies as conditions of
employment are enforceable in all jurisdictions.' Several circuit courts
have clarified these issues in the last several years.'83
The first question centers on the interpretation of the term "any other
class of worker engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" that is
contained in section 1 of the FAA."* Initially, some courts either expressly
held, or in dicta implied, that this clause excludes contracts between any
and all employers and any and all employees from the FAA's coverage.'85
This is clearly the minority opinion; only the Ninth Circuit currently
follows this position.'86 Alternatively, the First,8 7 Second,' Third,'89
Fourth, 19 Fifth, 91 Sixth,192 Seventh,' 93 Eighth, 94 Tenth, 95 and D.C. 196 Circuits
narrowly interpret the exemption and hold that the term refers only to those
employees in the transportation industry. Under this interpretation, the
FAA applies to all other employees, and therefore, an arbitration clause
estops all but a small class of employees from litigating their claims in
federal court. The Eleventh and Twelfth Circuits have not ruled on the
182. The distinction seems even more irrelevant when one examines the arbitration
agreement. The agreement addresses disputes between the employee and the employer. See id.
at 23. Thus, the fact that the contract is with the Stock Exchange and not the employer really
did not affect the context of the agreement.
183. See cases cited infra notes 186-197.
184. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
185. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Foster v.
Turley, 808 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1986); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal
Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) (declining to adopt a narrow construction of
section 1 because the inclusionary language in section 2 was intended to exercise the full extent
of the commerce power and reading the exclusionary clause using similar language narrowly
would be inconsistent). But see infra note 215; Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, 78
F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
186. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 161 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Matthew W.
Finkin, Employment Contracts Under the FAA-Reconsidered, 48 LAB. L.J. 329 (1997);
Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under the United States Arbitration Act. An Essay
in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996).
187. See Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971).
188. See Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
189. See Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1997); Tenney Eng'g,
Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, Local 437, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
190. See O'Neil v. Hilton Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272,274 (4th Cir. 1997).
191. See Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996).
192. See Cosgrove v. Shearson Lehman Bros., No. 95-3432, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS, at
*392 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 1997).
193. See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997).
194. See Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997).
195. See McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573 (10th Cir. 1998).
196. See Cole v. Bums Int'l See. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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issue.
A leading case supporting the majority position is Erving v. Virginia
Squires Basketball Club. 97 In 1971, Erving ("Dr. J") left the University of
Massachusetts and signed a contract to play basketball for the Virginia
Squires of the American Basketball Association ("ABA").' 9' Erving's
contract provided that any dispute would be settled by arbitration. 99 In
April of 1972, Erving signed a contract to play with the National Basketball
Association's ("NBA") Atlanta Hawks. The Squires sought to enforce
Erving's contract through arbitration. Erving sought to avoid arbitration
and have the court set aside his original contract. In his attempt to avoid
arbitration, Erving argued that his contract fell under the FAA's section 1
exclusion.20' In rejecting this argument, the court set forth in definitive
terms the limits of the exclusion: "[T]he exclusionary clause in [s]ection 1
applied only to those actually in the transportation industry. Erving clearly
is not involved in the transportation industry.'" Thus, the court deferred
the case to arbitration.
The trend following the Erving holding is exemplified by the Sixth
Circuit's changing position on the subject. In Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc.,2°3 the Sixth Circuit rejected the Erving holding and stated
that "all employment contracts with employers subject to regulation under
Title VII... fall within the [FAA's] exclusion .... 204 However, this
197. 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972).
198. See id at 1066.
199. See id at 1066 n.1. The contract's arbitration clause read as follows:
Arbitration. In the event of any dispute arising between the PLAYER and the
CLUB relating to any matter or thing whatever, whether or not arising under
this Contract, or concerning the performance or interpretation thereof, such
dispute shall be determined by arbitration before the Commissioner of the
American Basketball Association, or a person designated by such
Commissioner in writing for such purpose, acting as Arbitrator. The Arbitrator
shall determine by whom and in what proportion the cost of arbitration shall be
paid. The PLAYER and the CLUB hereby grant such Arbitrator full power to
determine such dispute in such manner as he shall direct, and under such rules
of procedure as he shall in his sole discretion adopt, and his decision shall be
final, binding and conclusive and may be enforced in any court, state or Federal,
having competent jurisdiction. Demand for arbitration hereunder shall be made
by notice in writing given to the other party and to the Commissioner of the
ASSOCIATION. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CLUB shall have the right
in its sole discretion to institute judicial proceedings for the purpose of
obtaining an injunction or other equitable relief pursuant to paragraph 5 hereof.
Id.
200. See id. at 1066.
201. See id. at 1068.
202. Id at 1069.
203. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
204. Il at311.
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statement was dicta. In Willis, the plaintiff, like the plaintiff in Gilmer, was
a stockbroker who signed an arbitration agreement with the applicable
stock exchange and not with her employer. 5 The court's sweeping view of
the section 1 exclusion was not relevant to the decision because: (1) the
contract was covered by FAA; and (2) the court did compel arbitration of
the plaintiff's sex discrimination case.2 In Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v.
Bates,207 the Sixth Circuit rejected the Willis dicta and held that the FAA's
section 1 exclusion should be interpreted narrowly and that the statute
should be applied to all employment contracts except those in the
transportation industry.S' Ten of the thirteen circuits have narrowly
interpreted the FAA; therefore, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
have to address the issue. However, two larger issues remain. First, is the
FAA relevant? Second, should it be relevant? We propose that it may not
and definitely should not be relevant.
F. The Enforceability of the FAA May Not and Should Not be Relevant
The second question left unanswered by Gilmer and its progeny is:
Does exclusion from the FAA's coverage prevent a compulsory arbitration
clause from being enforceable? Implicit in this question is the ubiquitous
lurking issue of federal preemption of state law and, specifically, the
preemptive extent of the FAA, because almost every state has adopted
some form of arbitration agreement legislation that may or may not extend
beyond the parameters set by section 1.2' Despite the fact that Gilmer and
its progeny may lead one to infer (and some cases do strongly imply) that
enforceability under the FAA is vital to the enforcement of these arbitration
clauses, we have found no authority expressly holding that an arbitration
clause will be unenforceable if the employment contract in question is
excluded by the FAA. However, the FAA's legislative history and relevant
case law supports the position that an arbitration clause should preclude
205. Seeid at310.
206. See idL
207. 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995).
208. See id at 600-01.
209. The issue of the preemptive effect of the FAA and the role of state arbitration statutes
has been raised in several Supreme Court decisions as well as numerous law review articles.
See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1984) (establishing that the FAA
creates a body of federal substantive law based on Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce and recognizing that the FAA preempts conflicting state law even for actions brought
in state courts); Thomas A. Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their Preemptive Effect upon
the Federal Arbitration Act: Reconciling the Supreme Court with Itself, 39 AIZ. L. REV. 35
(1997); Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims,
72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1347 (1997); Strickland, supra note 131, at 400-09 (discussing
potential direct and indirect conflicts that arise between the FAA and state arbitration
legislation).
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litigation regardless of whether the applicable contract falls within the
purview of the FAA.21
When Congress passed the FAA in 1925, the Seamen's Union, fearing
the effect of federal courts ordering arbitration, strongly opposed the
legislation.21' At the behest of the Union, Congress included the section 1
exclusion of employment contracts. Thus, the exclusion did not represent
a strong congressional policy, but instead constituted a political favor.2 3
From a policy perspective, legislation extended as a political favor in 1925
should not determine whether arbitration agreements should preclude an
employee from bringing an action into federal court pursuant to statutes
passed since 1964. In addition, legal authority supports the argument that
the FAA is irrelevant to the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in
employment.
In Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,2 4 the Fourth
Circuit did not consider the applicability of the FAA in determining
whether an arbitration clause precluded an employee from filing a lawsuit
in federal court. 5 The arbitration clause in Austin was located in a
collective bargaining agreement.2 6 The court stated that "in this circuit, the
FAA is not applicable to labor disputes arising from collective bargaining
agreements. 2 7 The court held, however: "In deciding whether to enforce
210. See infra discussion in text accompanying notes 211-227.
211. See American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 470
(11th Cir. 1987); see also Estreicher, supra note 209, at 1368 n.84 (citing Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v.
United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 207 F.2d 450, 452-53 (3d Cir. 1953)). The
Tenney court noted that:
Seamen constitute a class of workers as to whom Congress had long provided
machinery for arbitration. In exempting them the draftsmen excluded also
railroad employees, another class of workers as to whom special procedure for
the adjustment of disputes had previously been provided. Both these classes of
workers were engaged directly in interstate or foreign commerce. To these
draftsmen of the Act added "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." We think that the intent of the latter language was, under
the rule of ejusdem generis, to include only those other classes of workers who
are likewise engaged directly in commerce, that is, only those other classes of
workers who are actually engaged in the movement of interstate or foreign
commerce or in work so closely related thereto .... as to which special
arbitration legislation already existed and they rounded out the exclusionary
clause by excluding other similar classes of workers.
207 F.2d at 452-53.
212. See Estreicher, supra note 209, at 1368.
213. See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. Miller Metal Prods., 215 F.2d
221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) ("It appears that the exclusion clause of the Arbitration Act was
introduced into the statute to meet an objection of the Seafarers International Union ...
214. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
215. See i at 885.
216. See id. at 877.
217. Id. at 879.
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the arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement, we start
with and rely upon the 'well-recognized policy of federal labor law
favoring the arbitration of labor disputes.' 28  The court then compelled
arbitration.
The argument that enforceability under the FAA is not determinative
has been supported by cases from the Northern District of Illinois and the
District of Oregon. In Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas
Pension Fund v. Tank Transport, Inc., 219 a multiemployer pension fund
brought an action to collect contributions allegedly owed by the
employer.'0 The plaintiff sought to avoid arbitration by arguing that the
FAA excluded the employment contracts from its coverage."' Because the
contracts covered truck drivers, the court held that the section 1 exclusion
did apply.tm The court then stated, however, that the applicability of the
exclusion was not determinative of arbitrability.' Thus, while the FAA
"establishes a federal policy favoring arbitration," the fact that the FAA is
not immediately applicable to the issues in the instant case does not
eliminate arbitration as an acceptable dispute resolution mechanism, nor
does it evidence a presumption of nonarbitrability2 4 "A requirement to
arbitrate may still be valid regardless of whether the FAA is clearly
applicable." 't 5
Similarly, in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension
218. IdL (quoting Adkins v. Times-World Corp., 771 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1985)). In
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998), the Supreme Court had an
opportunity to decide if an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement could prevent
an employee from proceeding in federal court. Such a holding would have overruled Gardner-
Denver. However, the Court held that the clause in question was not specific enough to prevent
litigation and declined to rule on whether or not an arbitration clause could preclude an
employee from pursuing a claim in federal court. See id at 396.
219. 779 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. 11. 1991).
220. See iL at 948.
221. See iL at 949.
222. See id at 949-50.
223. See id at 949.
224. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (citing Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). The McMahon court
stated that:
This duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a party
bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights. As we
observed in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., "we are
well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and
of the competence of arbitral tribunals" should inhibit enforcement of the Act
"in controversies based on statutes."
Id (citation omitted).
225. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Tank Transp., Inc., 779
F. Supp. 947,949-50 n.3. (N.D. 111. 1991).
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Fund v. Goggin Truck Line, Inc.,2 6 the court, citing Tank Transport, stated:
"The fact that the Federal Arbitration Act's presumption in favor of
arbitration is inapplicable here does not, however, give rise to a
presumption against arbitration .... .,,2' Finally, the Pauly v. Biotronik,
GmbH2 court enforced an employment contract's arbitration clause
without even addressing the section 1 exclusion.29
While it has not been determined that the lack of the FAA's
applicability will not prevent an arbitration clause from being enforced, one
circuit and several district courts already recognize the irrelevance of the
FAA. It is therefore possible that absent legislation to the contrary,
arbitration could, in the future, be formally extended to all employment
contracts without regard to the FAA.
G. Employees Can Still File Charges with the EEOC
While the Gilmer Court held that an arbitration clause can prevent
employees from exercising their right to sue, it also stated, in dicta, that
arbitration agreements will not prevent employees from filing a charge with
the EEOC or "preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking classwide
and equitable relief."" Therefore, an employee who has signed an
arbitration agreement can file a claim with the EEOC, and if the EEOC
wishes to do so it may bring the case to federal court 31 According to the
one opinion that has addressed the issue, however, this is not the case.
In EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,32 the EEOC filed an ADEA
action on behalf of seventeen employees who were terminated by their
employer. 3 After the action was filed, but before the case was heard, the
defendant went out of business and eight of the seventeen plaintiffs
withdrew from the lawsuit.34 Because the employer was out of business,
the EEOC could not seek equitable relief"5 It did, however, continue with
the lawsuit in order to obtain monetary damages.36 The court, focusing on
the fact that the EEOC was seeking exclusively monetary relief, narrowly
interpreted the language in Gilmer and dismissed the case3 7 The court
226. 140 F.R.D. 362 (N.D. IM. 1991).
227. Id. at 364 n.3.
228. 738 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Or. 1990).
229. See id.
230. 500 U.S. 20,32(1991).
231. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1987) (allowing the
EEOC to bring suit in federal court); Estreicher, supra note 209, at 1373-74.
232. 979 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
233. See id at 245.
234. See id at 246.
235. See id
236. See idt
237. See id at 247.
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
held that the EEOC may litigate a federal lawsuit on behalf of employees
who have signed arbitration agreements only "where the EEOC seeks
broad-based relief designed to have [an] effect beyond the litigants
involved in a particular controversy.""8
Because of the specific facts of the case, the effect of the Kidder,
Peabody holding is not clear. One possible reading is that the EEOC may
pursue claims as long as equitable relief is available. Alternatively,
perhaps the EEOC may not seek money damages for plaintiffs if they have
signed arbitration agreements. Either way, Kidder, Peabody is incorrect
from both a legal and a policy standpoint.
From a legal standpoint, the Kidder, Peabody interpretation of Gilmer
is erroneous because it ignores the clear meaning and practical implications
of the Supreme Court's language. As discussed above, Gilmer states that:
(1) employees may still file claims with the EEOC; and (2) "arbitration
agreements will not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking
class-wide and equitable relief."' 9 The Kidder, Peabody holding is in error
because it: (1) ignores the first statement; and (2) holds, without any basis,
that the second statement represents the exclusive occasion upon which the
EEOC may bring an action.
Gilmer does not hold that the EEOC may bring a lawsuit only when
seeking class-wide and equitable relief. Instead, that is simply one instance
in which the Agency may file a lawsuit. This interpretation is based on the
fact that the Court's language is a response to one of Gilmer's arguments
against arbitration. Plaintiff Gilmer argued that arbitration procedures were
an improper forum for discrimination litigation because they did not
provide for broad equitable relief and class actions.240 In response, the
Court stated that "arbitration agreements will not preclude the EEOC from
bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief."24' It is spurious to
assume that a class-wide action seeking equitable relief represents the sole
occasion upon which the EEOC may pursue a lawsuit on behalf of
employees who have signed an arbitration agreement. Such an analysis
goes beyond the Court's plain language and is inconsistent with the Court's
statement that an employee may still file charges with the EEOC.
The Gilmer Court's statement that employees may file claims with the
EEOC is also a response to an argument by Gilmer. Plaintiff Gilmer
argued that arbitration would undermine the EEOC in enforcing the
ADEA.242 The Court was unpersuaded because employees could still file
238. Id.
239. 500 U.S. 20,32 (1991) (emphasis omitted).
240. See id
241. Id. (emphasis omitted).
242. Seeid at31.
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charges with the EEOC. 43 This must mean that the EEOC may bring an
action for both monetary and equitable relief on behalf of the plaintiffs,
despite an arbitration agreement. If not, there is no point to allowing an
employee to file a claim with the EEOC, for the EEOC's power would be
undermined severely. The EEOC's only power is the threat of a lawsuit. If
a lawsuit is not possible, there is no incentive for an employer to cooperate
with the EEOC in its investigations and conciliation processes. The
employer can provide a minimal amount of information, have the EEOC
find cause, and then laugh as the EEOC is powerless to go any further. By
allowing the employee to file with the EEOC, the Gilmer Court clearly
understood the practical realities of the system and permitted the EEOC the
right to pursue claims in its own discretion. Accordingly, from a legal
standpoint, Kidder, Peabody is incorrect.
Kidder, Peabody is also incorrect as a matter of policy. A private
arbitration agreement should not prevent the EEOC from bringing a case to
court or from obtaining relief. Arbitration is necessary because the
problems associated with EEOC investigations and private litigation (e.g.,
barriers to entry, costs, delays, perverse incentives, etc.),U encourage
undesirable behavior by bad actors and hurt good actors. In order to have
any relevance, the Agency needs to be able to pursue claims in federal
court. We believe the EEOC can be relevant.
Interpreted correctly, Gilmer establishes an excellent compromise. It
allows the EEOC to pursue claims that fit into its national enforcement
plan.245 If the EEOC does not classify the case as such, arbitration allows
the good actor employees and employers to avoid the costs, delays, and
other problems associated with private litigation and the understaffed,
overworked EEOC investigation process. Some employers argue that the
EEOC abuses its power and discretion. Such complaints, we hope, are
without merit. However, if they are true, arbitration should not be the
solution to the EEOC's abuse of its litigation power. Such abuse, if it
exists, can be addressed by the courts in the form of fee shifting, and by
Congress and the President in the form of limiting the EEOC's power or
changing its director. We do not believe that private parties should be able
to contract away the EEOC's or any other federal agency's relevance.
An employee's right to file cases with the EEOC and other federal
agencies, irrespective of the existence of an arbitration clause, is at the
243. See id. at 35.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 36,41-82,83-88.
245. The EEOC litigates only one half of 1% of the charges filed. See supra note 19.
246. One such employer, Stephen Sawitz, owner of Joe's Stone Crabs retaurant, came to this
conclusion after five years of interacting with the EEOC. See Stephen Sawitz, Lecture at Statler
School of Hotel Administration, Cornell University (Mar. 2, 1998); see also EEOC v. Joe's
Stone Crabs, 969 F. Supp. 727 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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heart of a case filed with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). 47
Bentley's Luggage Corporation, a Florida employer, required all of its
employees to sign an agreement under which they agreed to arbitrate any
employment dispute.24 The plaintiff alleged that, in addition to containing
general waiver language, the policy prevented employees from filing
charges with any federal or state agency.249  As noted above, such a
provision violates Gilmer, which expressly states that claims may be filed
with the EEOC."0 In addition, and not surprisingly, the NLRB issued a
complaint that the provision undermined the general purpose of this and
other agencies (e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA")).25' The parties settled with the employer, altering the
agreement so that it complied with Gilmer and allowed employees to file
charges with the NLRB regardless of the arbitration requirement.21'
H. Arbitration Agreements Must Satisfy Certain Minimal Requirements
Courts will only enforce arbitration policies that provide a fair process
for the adjudication of employees' statutory rights. However, neither the
Supreme Court nor Congress has defined criteria that, if met, would
constitute a fair policy. This does not mean that there is a dearth of
authority delineating what constitutes a fair policy. In fact, guidance from
several academic sources is available on the subject.2 In arguing that
particular arbitration systems are not fair, some employee-plaintiffs have
focused on a number of different procedures that are inherent to every
policy. In response to these attacks, courts' holdings provide a basis for
establishing the criteria of what an enforceable policy must contain.
Because the courts are reacting to attacks, as opposed to establishing
criteria, the holdings are not always definitive and may not provide
absolute guidance. Still, enough authority exists to provide the guidance
247. See 96 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-15 (May 17, 1996) (describing the outcome of In
re Bentley's Luggage Corp., No. 12-CA-16658, 1995 WL 912536 (N.L.R.B.G.C. 1995)).
248. See id
249. See id.
250. See 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991).
251. See 96 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-15 (May 17,1996).
252. See id.
253. See Jennifer N. Manuszak, Pre-Dispute Civil Rights Arbitration in the Nonunion
Sector: The Need for a Tandem Reform Effort at the Contracting, Procedural and Judicial
Review Stages, 12 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 387, 415 (1997); JAMS/Endispute Issues
Minimum Standards for Employment Arbitration, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP., Mar.
1995, at 50, 50; see also TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION, A DUE PROCESS
PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DIsPUTrEs ARISING OUT OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995); Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment
Claims: A Practical Guide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47
BAYLORL. REV. 591 (1995).
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necessary to explain what types of policies will, and will not be, upheld.
In examining fairness, Gilmer and its progeny focus on five different
issues: (1) the method of delivering opinions; (2) the procedures for
selecting arbitrators; (3) discovery; (4) available damages; and (5)
voluntariness and knowledge in entering into the agreement.' In
addressing the first of the three issues, courts have set forth standards that
are easily understood and followed. The fourth and fifth issues are not as
clear.
The first issue concerns written opinions. In Gilmer, the employee
argued that arbitration was an unacceptable form of discrimination
adjudication because in some circumstances decisions are not written."" In
rejecting this argument the Court noted that the New York Stock
Exchange's ("NYSE") procedures required written opinions. 6 While the
Court did not hold that written opinions were a requirement, it did imply
that a policy should provide for such. 7  Written opinions should be
required because they enable arbitration participants, the EEOC, and
Congress to study the opinions of past decisions. Such study is vital when
choosing an arbitrator, deciding whether to settle a case, and determining if
the law is being applied correctly5 8  Such a requirement should not,
however, reduce or eliminate confidentiality. The parties' names could be
deleted from the reported case. The only relevant name is that of the
arbitrator5
9
The courts have uniformly held that the employee must be able to
participate in the selection of the arbitrator. In Gilmer, the NYSE
procedures allowed parties (as members of the NYSE) to access
information about the arbitrators' backgrounds and employment histories.
Employee advocates criticized this policy because parties that were not
members of the NYSE had no say in arbitrator selection. 21 Furthermore,
254. The Gilmer Court reiterates the savings clause of section 2 of the FAA ([A]rbitration
agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."). See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The Court also states that "[t]here is no
indication in this case, however, that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or
defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his registration application." Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 33.
255. Seeid. at31-32.
256. See id. at 32.
257. See id.
258. Such decisions would still lack res judicata and precedentially binding effect on future
parties.
259. The Labor Arbitration Reports currently include the names of the arbitrators in their
opinions, but substitute "Grievant," "P,, or "C2' for plaintiffs' names.
260. See 500 U.S. at 30. See also infra note 263.
261. See Leason v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 776, 782
(1985); Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 56 (1997); H. David Kelly, Jr., An Argument for
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the pool of arbitrators was almost always comprised of white males who
were over sixty years of age, and the arbitrators were not trained in
discrimination law. 62 Despite these objections, the Gilmer Court accepted
this system because in choosing the arbitrator, each side was allowed one
peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause. 63 It should also
be noted that the courts will not enforce a policy that does not allow for a
fair and impartial third party to decide a case. For example, in Cheng-
Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Associates,2 the employer's arbitration
policy allowed management to select a committee to hear complaints. The
committee included two employees, two managers, and the general
manager, who would serve as a tie-breaker if needed.265  Because the
adjudicators were selected by management, the court held that the policy
was unfair, thus enabling the employee to file her claim in court.
261
Regarding discovery, the NYSE's rules provided for document
Retaining the Well Established Distinction Between Contractual and Statutory Claims in Labor
Arbitration, 75 U. DET. MERcYL. REv. 1, 52 (1997).
262. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449,
450-51 n.7 (citing Margaret A. Jacobs, Employers' Required Arbitration of Job-Bias Claims
Stirs Criticism, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1994, at B5). The General Accounting Office ("GAO")
reported that "the majority of arbitrators who hear discrimination claims are white, male and
over the age of 60." IL Additionally, "89% of the 3000 arbitrators used by the New York
Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers are men. According to the
GAO study, arbitrators are usually retired or semi-retired executives or professionals. They are
not trained to understand the intricacies of discrimination law and frequently lack subject matter
expertise." LIL (citation omitted). See also Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial
Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and Callfor Dialogue, 10 OHo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
343, 364-65 n.88 (1995); Dorissa Bolinski & David Singer, Why Are So Few Women in the
ADR Field?, ARB. J., Sept. 1993, at 61.
263. See 500 U.S. at 30. The Court wrote:
[W]e note that the NYSE arbitration rules, which are applicable to the dispute in
this case, provide protections against biased panels. The rules require, for
example, that the parties be informed of the employment histories of the
arbitrators, and that they be allowed to make further inquiries into the
arbitrators' backgrounds. In addition, each party is allowed one peremptory
challenge and unlimited challenges for cause. Moreover, the arbitrators are
required to disclose "any circumstances which might preclude [them] from
rendering an objective and impartial determination."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). See also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 206-12 (D. Mass. 1998) (appeal pending) (discussing
the possibility of institutional bias due to industry influence over arbitration before self-
regulating organizations and, in particular, under the rules of the NYSE).
264. 50 Cal. App. 4th 676 (1996).
265. See id. at 680.
266. See id. at 687-88. The court also relied on the fact that the employee was discouraged
from using counsel, could not confront adverse witnesses, and that the parties did not intend the
agreement to be binding. See id, at 690-91.
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production, information requests, depositions, and subpoenas.267 While not
as formal or expensive as discovery in federal court, the discovery in
Gilmer could have been extensive. A policy providing for a less exhaustive
form of discovery is, however, most likely unenforceable. According to
Gilmer, arbitration involves trading off the procedures of federal court for
the "simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. ' 68 Indeed, lower
courts have reasonably upheld limited discovery. For example, in Williams
v. Katten, Muchin, & Zavis,269 the Seventh Circuit upheld the American
Arbitration Association's ("AAA") discovery rules. Under the AAA's
rules, the arbitrator may "subpoena witnesses and documents either
independently or upon the request of the parties. '  This level of
discovery, which is minimal when compared to that of federal court, was
acceptable to the Seventh Circuit.
The issue of damages is somewhat nebulous. The Gilmer Court noted
that arbitrators have authority to award full damages available under the
relevant statutes.27 ' The Court stated that "'[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum."'272 One can infer from this language that Gilmer supports
the proposition that the damages set forth by a statute constitute substantive
rights. 3  Thus, an arbitration policy cannot limit these rights. This is
exactly the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit reached in Graham Oil Co. v.
Arco Products Co.274 In Graham Oil, the arbitration policy in a franchise
agreement did not allow for exemplary damages, costs, or attorneys' fees.275
The parties' franchise agreement was covered however, by the Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA").276 The PMPA expressly stated that
successful plaintiffs alleging a violation of the statute could recover
exemplary damages, costs, and fees.277 In denying enforcement of the
267. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991); NYSE Inc., The
Exchange Constitution and Rules (visited Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.nyse.com/public/search/
07ix.htm>.
268. 500 U.S. at 31.
269. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18301 (N.D. II. 1996)
270. Id. at*13.
271. See500U.S. at32.
272. Id. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)) (alteration in original).
273. See Estreicher, supra note 209, at 1353 ("When a contract provides for arbitration of
statutory claims, the arbitrator must be empowered to apply statutory standards and, if a
violation is found, to award statutory remedies.").
274. 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994).
275. See id at 1247-48.
276. See id at 1246; see also Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-297, 92
Stat. 322 (1978) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806) (1994)).
277. See id at § 2805(b).
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arbitration agreement, the court defined the damages as "statutorily-
mandated rights" and then stated: "[b]ecause the arbitration clause
employed by ARCO compels Graham Oil to surrender important
statutorily-mandated rights afforded franchisees by the PMPA, we hold that
the clause contravenes the Act." '27
Some courts that uphold arbitration clauses limiting damages still
allow plaintiffs to obtain full relief. In Kinnebrew v. Gulf Insurance Co.,279
the Northern District of Texas enforced an arbitration agreement that
limited damages after holding that remedies are procedural, not substantive
rights.'0 The Kinnebrew court, however, retained jurisdiction over the case
to allow the plaintiff, if she prevailed, an opportunity to bring the case back
to federal court and obtain the full relief set forth under the statutes at
issue."' Accordingly, some jurisdictions that allow employers to limit
arbitrators' ability to provide damages do not prevent plaintiffs from being
awarded the damages set forth in the statute*2
2
The last requirement of a lawful arbitration policy is that the process
constitutes a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to file a federal
court action.2" "Knowing" and "voluntary" can be bifurcated into two
distinct criteria. Plaintiff Gilmer argued that his contract was not
voluntarily entered into because it was a take-it-or-leave-it offer.2 In
response, the Gilmer Court stated that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining
power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context." ' 5
This issue of what constitutes a knowing waiver has been addressed in
a number of cases. In both Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai2*
278. Graham Oil, 43 F.3d at 1248.
279. 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1994).
280. See id. at 190.
281. See id. The relevant statutes in question in Kinnebrew were the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. See id. 'The Court retains jurisdiction over
this action to consider any statutory remedies to which Plaintiff is entitled after arbitration is
completed." Id. at 191.
282. But see Degaetano v. Smith Barney Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 401, 405
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996) (holding that "[tihe mere fact that these statutory remedies [referring to
attorneys' fees, punitive damages, and injunctive relief] may be unavailable in the arbitral forum
does not itself establish that Title VII claims must be resolved in a court of law"). But the court
went on to note, in accordance with Gilmer, that the plaintiff may still file a charge with the
EEOC. See id.
283. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that waivers of a judicial forum for statutory employment discrimination claims must be
knowing and voluntary); see also Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody Asset Management, Inc., 966 F.
Supp. 218, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (appeal pending) (stating that arbitration agreements not
entered into knowingly and voluntarily are unenforceable).
284. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,32-33 (1991).
285. Ia at33.
286. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
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and Farrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 2 7 the Ninth and Seventh Circuits,
respectively, held that generic arbitration clauses that did not explicitly
state that they covered employment disputes were not specific enough to
provide employees with notice that they were bound to arbitrate Title VII
claims and ADEA claims.2s
In Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp.,n9 the Ninth Circuit held
that an arbitration clause in an employee handbook, which clearly stated
that it applied to federal and state statutes, still did not constitute a knowing
waiver. The Court refused to enforce the handbook's policy for three
reasons. First, the acknowledgment that the plaintiff signed upon receipt of
the handbook did not state that the plaintiff agreed to abide by the
handbook's terms.' Instead, it simply stated that the plaintiff agreed to
"read and understand" the document.*9  Second, the acknowledgment did
not notify the plaintiff that, "the Handbook contained an arbitration clause
or that his acceptance of the Handbook constituted a waiver of this right to
a judicial forum in which to resolve claims covered by the ADA."2
Finally, the acknowledgment referred to the Handbook as a "guideline" to
the company's policies, not as a contract. 3  In dissent, Judge Rymer
argued that the handbook was a contract and had the employer breached the
terms set forth in the handbook the employee would have had a viable
287. 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993).
288. In refusing to compel arbitration, the Farrand court examined the language of the
arbitration clause in the National Association of Securities Dealers' rules and stated that while
the rules could be "stretched" to cover discrimination cases, "this was not the most natural
reading." Id at 1255. In Lai, the court focused on the fact that the clause did not mention
discrimination lawsuits. See id. at 1302-04.
289. 119 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1997).
290. The handbook stated, "I have received a copy of the Cyprus Bagdad Copper
Corporation Handbook that is effective July 1, 1993 and understand that the Handbook is a
guideline to the Company's policies and procedures. I agree to read it and understand its
contents. If I have any questions regarding its contents I will contact my supervisor or Human
Resources Representative." l- at 758. The Nelson court concluded as follows:
Nelson agreed only to "read and understand" the Handbook. He did not agree
to be bound by its provisions. Certainly, nothing in the acknowledgment form
notified him that by agreeing to "read and understand," he was additionally
agreeing to waive any rights or remedies afforded him by civil rights statutes
that might be inconsistent with the terms set out in the Handbook. Indeed, the
acknowledgment form itself suggests quite the opposite by characterizing the
Handbook as a "guideline" to the company's unilaterally promulgated policies
and procedures. Merely signing the form did not in any way constitute a
"knowing agreement to arbitrate," and thereby to surrender his statutory right to
a judicial forum.
Id. at 761.
291. Id
292. Id. at761.
293. Id.
EMPLOYMENT DIsPuTEs
cause of action.2 4 A contract enforceable against an employer must also be
enforceable against an employee.295
i. Legislative Developments
Since Gilmer, legislation pending in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate would ban mandatory arbitration
agreements. 6 These bills, sponsored by Senator Russell Feingold (D) of
Wisconsin and Representative Edward Markey (D) of Massachusetts, have
never come close to being enacted. The most recent Senate bill in this area,
the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1997, would prohibit
arbitration unless agreed to by both parties at the time the case ripened.29'
Senator Feingold and former Representative Patricia Schroeder drafted
similar legislation in 1993, 1994, and 1995.298 These bills lacked support
and seem ill-conceived. According to a Markey staffer, the Congressman's
objection to arbitration is based, in large part, on the findings of a study of
the age, gender, and ethnicity of arbitrators in the securities industry.
2
"
Representative Markey believed the process was unfair because 89% of the
arbitrators were white males who were over fifty-five years of age and
were not trained in discrimination law.3 We believe it unwise to propose
legislation banning an entire system because of one aspect that could be
corrected so easily. Rather, Congress should focus on ensuring the fairness
of arbitration in the legislation it drafts. To this end, we have devised what
we call the Model Arbitration Act ("MAA").
1II. THE MODEL ARBITRATION ACT
We drafted the Model Arbitration Act for employment discrimination
claims after studying Gilmer, the conclusions of the Dunlop Commission
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations,'0 1 and the arguments made
by the EEOC3 and other numerous critics of mandatory arbitration.3"
Additionally, we consulted both the American Arbitration Association's
294. See id. at 764.
295. See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 83 (1996) (proposing a system to ensure that all employment contract arbitration
provisions are voluntarily agreed to by employees).
296. See Civil Rights Protection Act, S. 63, 105th Cong. (1997).
297. See id.
298. Telephone Interview with Tamara Fucile, Assistant to Rep. Markey (Mar. 18, 1998).
299. See iL
300. See id.
301. See Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Final Report (visited
Feb. 20, 1999) <http:llwww.ilr.comeH.edu/library/earchivetDunlop/dunlop.contents.html>.
302. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 17.
303. See supra note 16.
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Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes,3" and the CPR Institute
for Dispute Resolution's model rules for arbitrations.O' Accordingly, the
MAA specifically addresses many of the problems identified by the Court,
commission, and critics. If adopted, the MAA would provide employers
with a statutorily enforceable arbitration policy. While parties would
always be free to contract out of the MAA's provisions, such agreements
would be unenforceable if contested. Below are the key elements of the
MAA:
1. Filing of Claims
All employers with arbitration policies must submit copies of such
policies to the EEOC within fifteen days of their enactment. Prior to
submitting their cases to arbitration, employees may file their claims with
the EEOC. The EEOC will have thirty days to determine if the case fits
within its national enforcement plan. If so, and if the employee wishes the
Agency to be involved in the case, the EEOC may litigate on behalf of the
plaintiff(s) or class. If the employee does not wish the EEOC to be
involved, or if the case does not fit into the EEOC's national enforcement
plan, the case will be deferred to arbitration.3"
2. The Law and Damages
The arbitrators must follow the applicable federal and state substantive
law. Arbitrators must comply with the statutorily prescribed damage
provisions.
3. Establishment of a Body to License, Select, and Monitor
Arbitrators
Congress shall create or empower an agency that serves three
functions: licensing, selecting, and monitoring arbitrators.
a. Licensing
Unlike labor arbitrators, employment discrimination arbitrators need
to be trained in the law of the land, not the law of the shop. The agency
304. See American Arbitration Association, National Rules for the Resolution of
Employment Disputes (visited Feb. 4, 1998) <http:llwww.adr.org/nles/employment
_rules.html>.
305. See CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, CPR Non Administered Arbitration Rules
and Commentary (visited Feb. 4, 1998) <http://www.cpradr.orgarbrules.htm>.
306. See Estreicher, supra note 209, at 1350.
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will establish criteria that all discrimination arbitrators must meet. These
criteria will include education and practical experience in the field. A
mandatory licensing exam will ensure that the arbitrators are
knowledgeable in the applicable law.07 From those that are licensed, the
agency will establish a panel of a limited number of arbitrators for each
geographic area."0
b. Selection
When a case is set for arbitration the agency will randomly select
seven arbitrators from its panel. The arbitrators will be submitted to the
parties. Each party will have one peremptory challenge and unlimited
challenges for cause. An arbitrator will be randomly selected from those
who are not disqualified.
c. Monitoring Arbitrators
Arbitrators will be required to file written opinions with the agency
and the EEOC. The arbitrators will delete the names of the employer and
the employee from the opinion. These opinions must describe: (1) the facts
of the case; (2) the applicable legal standards; and (3) the application of the
law to the facts so that the conclusion drawn can be understood. The
agency will continually employ experts in the field to review the cases of
the arbitrators to ensure that they are qualified to remain on the panel. The
EEOC can use these opinions to ensure that arbitrators are applying the law
correctly. If not, the EEOC can draft new regulations, propose new
legislation to Congress, or make the issue part of its national enforcement
plan.
307. While the MAA as outlined herein does not establish specific criteria in this regard,
accompanying regulations could do so. The regulations could, for example, set criteria for
course work, years of experience in the field, an exam, etc. Rule 1 I(a)(i) of the AAA 1998
Rules requires that arbitrators "shall be experienced in the field of employment law." American
Arbitration Association, supra note 304.
308. Based on numerous conversations the authors held with arbitrators, practitioners, and
academics, there is a huge demand to be on this panel. Some may question why we would not
allow the AAA or another private agency to establish its own criteria. Two of the goals of the
MAA are to improve the quality of adjudication and to assure the parties that the adjudicator is
qualified. We believe that the exam is a simple way of ensuring quality and reducing distrust in
the system.
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4. Arbitration Procedures
a. Discovery
The parties will be allowed document requests as well as a limited
number of interrogatories and depositions. The parties can depose the
plaintiffs, defendants, and the defendants' decision makers. The parties
must submit a witness list one month prior to arbitration. All discovery
must be completed within three months of the case being deferred to
arbitration.
b. Burden of Proof
The burden of proof will be in accordance with federal law.
c. Damages.
All damages provided by the Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA,
including attorney's fees, will be available.
d. Rules of Evidence
Arbitrators are permitted discretion in rendering appropriate, yet
simplified, rules of evidence and procedure.
e. Costs
The employer will be liable for the cost of the arbitration. Each party
will bear all of its own other costs.
5. Arbitration Agreements
Arbitration agreements cannot be part of an employee handbook.
Instead, they must be embodied in the form of a separate document that
clearly states the parameters of the agreement.309  For example, the
document must state if employment is ay will or not. It must also inform
employees that they are free to hire counsel and file claims with
appropriate government agencies.
309. This assures that the waiver will be knowing.
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IV. THE CRITICS' ARGUMENTS AGAINST ADR
While there are numerous critics of mandatory arbitration,31 few
arguments have been set forth against the process. Below we examine the
arguments set forth by the EEOC's July 11, 1997 policy statement against
mandatory arbitration and a law review article by Professor Katherine
Stone."' We chose the EEOC's statement because it is the most relevant
position on the matter."' We analyze Professor Stone's article because of
its high quality and the challenges involved in contesting her conclusions.
It must be noted that the EEOC, Professor Stone, and other critics of
mandatory arbitration categorically do not oppose alternative dispute
resolution. While these critics are against agreements in which the parties
prospectively exchange their rights to a jury trial for adjudication in
arbitration, so-called voluntary arbitration is almost universally endorsed.3
Under voluntary arbitration policies, a claim is submitted to an arbitrator
only if both parties choose arbitration after the case has ripened.
Voluntary arbitration is an appealing concept, but it is unlikely to
mend a broken system. In the vast majority of cases, one of the parties will
not agree to arbitrate because it can utilize the threat of litigation as a
strategic tool. Such strategic behavior will manifest itself in the following
ways: employers who have violated the law, or believe the merits of the
case to be unfavorable to them, will not submit a claim to arbitration.
14
Such actors do not want a relatively quick assessment of damages against
them. Instead, these employers will utilize the delay and discovery tactics
that are part and parcel of federal court litigation in order to force a plaintiff
to compromise and accept a reduced settlement amount. Employees who
file frivolous cases will also not be encouraged to arbitrate. They would be
better off extorting the employer with the high costs of litigation. The
economics of discrimination litigation is to blame for these seemingly
perverse incentives. Thus, the only situation in which both parties will
agree to arbitrate is where they both truly believe that they can prove their
310. See supranote 15.
311. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:
The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1017 (1996).
312. The National Academy of Arbitrators has adopted a position similar to that of the
EEOC. See National Academy of Arbitrators' Statement and Guidelines Adopted May 21,
1997, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 103, at E-1 (May 29, 1997).
313. See Estreicher, supra note 209, at 1375 n.10; Hoffman, supra note 16; Ware, supra
note 295, at 108; Note, Taking the "Alternative" Out of the Dispute Resolution of Title VII
Claims: The Implications of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of Arbitration Agreements
Arising Out of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D. L. REV. 435 (1994).
314. Attorneys advising employers in such situations would be likely to advise their clients
not to agree to arbitrate a claim voluntarily when there is a high likelihood that the employee
will prevail on the merits. A better litigation strategy would be to hold out for the greater
probability that the employee will settle out his claim to avoid litigation.
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respective cases. This represents an insignificant number of claims.
315
Accordingly, the relevant debate centers not on voluntary versus mandatory
arbitration but rather on mandatory arbitration versus EEOC investigations
and federal court litigation. The critics do not, however, set forth the
debate in this context. Instead, critics attack arbitration and imply, or at
least lead the readers to infer, that the current system rectifies the
imbalance of power between employees and employers, is free from other
identifiable problems, and safeguards employees against unlawful
discrimination. For example, in its July 11, 1997 policy statement on
mandatory arbitration, the EEOC began by stating:
We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is old as the
scriptures and as clear as the American Constitution. The heart
of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal
rights and equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat our
fellow Americans as we want to be treated.
16
The EEOC then concludes that mandatory arbitration is inherently
unfair. The implication, which is expressed in the Agency's arguments, is
that the current system balances power and is an open, effective avenue for
employees to pursue their rights. As explained above, this is not the case.
Below, we examine the EEOC and Professor Stone's arguments in
light of the MAA and the litigation alternative. We divide the arguments
into two categories. The first category may be labeled, "complaints that are
easily addressed by the MAA." The fact that these so-called problems are
simple to correct does not mean that they are legitimate criticisms. We
contest those arguments that are without basis. The second group of
complaints are those that attack inherent components of mandatory
arbitration. While the MAA may resolve some of these concerns, they are
impossible to "correct" completely. We address each issue by arguing that
they are either: (1) invalid; or (2) acceptable in light of the alternative-the
present system.
V. CORRECTABLE COMPLAINTS
As stated above, this section identifies the arguments that are easily
315. Michael F. Hoellering, the general counsel of the AAA, said that 95% of the
arbitrations handled by the AAA are submitted by parties that have agreed on arbitration before
a dispute arose. He predicted that it will be hard to obtain an agreement to arbitrate if that
decision must be made after a dispute has begun. See Arbitration: AAA General Counsel
Discusses Nonunion Employment Disputes, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at D-13 (Feb. 16,
1995); see also Ware, supra note 295, at 160.
316. EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 17, at II (citing
President John F. Kennedy's address to the nation regarding his intention to introduce a
comprehensive civil rights bill).
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addressed by the MAA. First we address such arguments made by the
EEOC followed by those set forth by Professor Stone.
A. Arbitration Does Not Allow for the Development of the Law317
One of the EEOC's complaints about arbitration is that it "affords no
opportunity to build a jurisprudence through precedent. ' '318 What the EEOC
means is that arbitration will greatly reduce the number of cases that are
litigated so that law will not develop through case law. This argument is
overstated, ignores reality, and is correctable. It is overstated because it
assumes that the vast majority of employers will implement mandatory
arbitration policies. No evidence exists to support this argument.
Employers who implement such policies need both the resources to
administrate them and the ability to ensure that they will not subject
themselves to numerous adverse verdicts that will result without the delays
and barriers of litigation. The argument ignores reality because the vast
majority of cases settle.319 Cases that settle have no precedential value, yet
the EEOC not only allows settlement, it attempts to "resolve" all claims
that are filed by pushing settlement as early as possible.3 m Finally, not only
is this argument correctable, but also arbitration would correct the current
situation. The so-called "A cases" involve new issues of law. If the EEOC
believes judicial review is necessary, these issues will be litigated.
Moreover, under the MAA, all decisions, which must contain full opinions,
are filed with the EEOC. If arbitrators are misinterpreting the law, or if an
A case is not litigated, the EEOC can: (1) establish clear regulations; (2)
lobby Congress to change or clarify the law; or (3) litigate the next case in
which the issue arises. Because of mandatory arbitration, an adjudicator)'
process with written opinions will replace settlements based on the costs of
defense. Thus, there will be more cases from which a body of law can
develop. 2'
317. See id. at V-A-2.
318. l
319. See Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form,
(visited Feb. 8, 1999) <http:llteddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questcv2.htm>.
320. See PRioRrrY CHARGE HANDLING PROCEDURES, supra note 43; see also text
accompanying note 53.
321. See Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512 (2d Cir. 1995). In Lyons, the court
overturned the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of a defendant. See id. at
1517. The defendant had argued that the ADA did not require it to provide a parking spot in
lower Manhattan for an employee whose disability prevented her from using mass transit. See
id, at 1513-14. No rational employer who has to pay counsel would litigate this issue. Assume
a parking spot cost in the neighborhood of $500 per month, or $6,000 per year. Unless the
employer believed that it was setting a precedent, it would make little sense to litigate. This
case was litigated only because the defendant had pro bono representation. Because the court
ruled that a parking spot could be a reasonable accommodation, rational employers will settle
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B. Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Will Adversely Affect the
Commission's Ability to Enforce the Civil Rights Law322
Underlying this complaint is the assumption that the EEOC is
currently doing an adequate job at enforcing civil rights laws. This is a
questionable proposition' 3 Regardless of the EEOC's current efficacy,
arbitration under the MAA will enable the EEOC to enforce the law more
effectively. The EEOC's policy statement alleges that employees will not
file claims with the EEOC because they will not know that they can, or will
see it as useless.324 The EEOC will therefore be deprived access to potential
A cases. Under the MAA, however, the EEOC has access to all claims
prior to arbitration, and therefore has the choice to litigate. Thus, the
EEOC will not lose access, but will conserve scarce resources. Under the
MAA, the Agency will be able to defer numerous B and C cases to
arbitration. Thus, the existing resources can be used to litigate A cases and
better investigate the B and C cases that are not deferred.3"
This position is similar to that argued by Professor Maurice E.R.
Munroe in The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect.326 Munroe argues
that the EEOC is ineffective because it spends too much of its resources
investigating and not enough litigating.327 He further contends that the
EEOC should no longer investigate claims it does not intend to litigate.
32
We agree. Instead of pursuing investigation and conciliation, the Agency
should defer B and C cases to arbitration where applicable.
C. Arbitration Is Too Expensive for Employees
Professor Stone argues that some arbitration agreements require
employees to pay their own legal fees and one-half of the arbitrator's fees,
"a sum that could easily exceed $1,000.,,329 This is true. But to what is the
$1,000 being compared? In both arbitration and private litigation
employees must pay for all of their own legal fees. The costs associated
with arbitration, even if the employee had to pay one half of the arbitrator's
fee, are almost always far less than the costs associated with the litigation
process, which include filing fees, full discovery, motions, and other
rather than litigate. The same employers would, however, arbitrate the case because the costs
are greatly reduced.
322. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 17, at V-C.
323. See supra text accompanying note 37-88.
324. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 17, at V-C.
325. See Estreicher, supra note 209, at 1374-75.
326. See Munroe, supra note 53.
327. See id at 270-74.
328. See id. at 274-78.
329. Stone, supra note 311, at 1037.
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
costs.33 A survey of 321 NELA member lawyers and 330 ABA member
attorneys "regularly representing employees in discrimination disputes"
revealed that the average requirements for plaintiff lawyers included a
required retainer of $3,000 to $3,600."' The only other available
alternative for an employee wishing to vindicate her statutory rights is to
file a claim with the EEOC.
Filing a claim with the EEOC is free. But there is a cost far greater
than $1,000 or even $10,000 for employees with legitimate but not eye-
catching claims to merit focused attention from the Agency. As stated
above, the EEOC litigates on behalf of only 0.05% of the employees who
file claims.332 Moreover, 90.8% of employees who file EEOC charges have
their cases dismissed without receiving any benefits, and only 7.7% of
these employees receive any relief.333 Munroe explains that plaintiffs suffer
greatly at the hands of the EEOC: most parties fail to receive the expected
benefits, and the settlements that are made undercompensate plaintiffs on
the average.3  The question then becomes whether the EEOC is doing an
adequate job when it finds merit in a mere 9.2% of its cases. Although
Professor Stone does not expressly state her position on the subject, it is
reasonable to infer that she believes that most employee claims have merit,
or at least more than 9.2% of the those inclined to file charges. If this is
true, filing a claim with the EEOC, although free from economic cost, is
not a viable avenue for a wronged employee seeking redress.
Under the MAA, employers pay the full costs of arbitration. The
employee must pay only for his or her own legal fees and costs. Also, the
EEOC has the opportunity to decide if it wishes to take the case to court
and relieve the employee of any costs. Thus, employees incur costs only if
they have B or C cases. We believe this is equivalent to the situation now,
except for the fact that the costs are reduced, and access to adjudication is
greatly augmented.
D. Gilmer Agreements Reduce the Amount of Damages Available
Professor Stone argues that courts "almost always uphold" Gilmer
agreements, even when such agreements bar employees from recovering
punitive damages, consequential damages, and other remedies potentially
available to these employees in court.333 Professor Stone cites two cases to
330. See Ritter & Albrecht, supra note 39.
331. See Howard, supra note 108.
332. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
333. See iL
334. See Munroe, supra note 53, at 271.
335. Stone, supra note 311, at 1039.
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support her contention-Kinnebrew v. Gulf Insurance Co.3 6 and Degaetano
v. Smith Barney, Inc."' Degaetano, which is the only case we have found
that can be read to support Professor Stone's position, upheld an arbitration
agreement that prevented the arbitrator from awarding punitive damages or
injunctive relief of any kind.338 It is possible, however, that the plaintiff in
Degaetano could have filed an action in court seeking punitive damages. 9
The court did not address this issue.
Because the Degaetano court relies on Mitsubishi Motors,34' it is
logical to interpret Degaetano as allowing a plaintiff to seek full statutorily
available remedies in federal court after prevailing at an arbitration that
adjudicated the merits but limited the arbitrator's ability to award full
relief. The Mitsubishi court enforced an agreement to arbitrate two federal
statutorily based claims, but stated that it would "have the opportunity at
the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the
enforcement of antitrust laws has been addressed." ' 2 One can infer from
this language that the court held that it had the right to award the full
statutory damages if the arbitrator found for the plaintiffs, but either did not
or could not fully compensate them. This is exactly Kinnebrew's holding.
In Kinnebrew the court upheld an arbitration agreement that limited
damages, but retained jurisdiction so that plaintiffs would have an
opportunity to obtain full relief. 3'
336. 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 1994).
337. 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 401 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996).
338. See id. at 405 n.4.
339. See Kinnebrew, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 189.
340. The court is concerned with squaring section 118 of the 1991 amendments to Title VII
(which states that, "[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution including.., arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title." Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 107 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 198 la (1994))) with the rest of Title
VII and the 1991 amendments which made punitive damages available. See Degaetano, 70 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 405. But the main concern of the court is that the statute "'continue
to serve both its remedial and deterrent function."' It (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614,637 (1985)).
341. 473 U.S. at 637.
342. Id. at 638.
343. See 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 189. Professor Stone also relies on Pony
Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App. 1996) to support her contention
that courts almost always allow arbitration clauses that curtail damages to less than what is
statutorily mandated. Pony Express does not, however, enforce an arbitration agreement that
limits damages. Instead, it remands the case so that the court's award is consistent with Graham
Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), and Kinnebrew. See Pony Express
Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817, 822 (Tex. App. 1996). As explained above, Graham
Oil holds that damages set forth in a statute are substantive rights that cannot be reduced. See 43
F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994). Kinnebrew holds that a damages provision in an arbitration
clause is not a matter of "substantive rights," but the court retains jurisdiction so that the
employee can obtain full relief. 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 190-91. On remand, the
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While this two-step process of going to arbitration and filing with the
EEOC lacks efficiency and increases the time and expenses of the
arbitration process, it does not, as Professor Stone contends, limit the
available relief. However, even if courts upheld such agreements without
retaining jurisdiction, the MAA addresses this concern by requiring
arbitration agreements to provide the damages provisions set forth in the
statutes!4"
E. The Public Plays No Role in Selecting Arbitrators
The critics argue that the public plays no role in selecting arbitrators
and that the arbitrators selected may not be qualified.345 We agree. Under
the current system, the arbitrators need not be trained, knowledgeable, or
fair. They simply must be acceptable to both sides. We believe that this
criterion is unsatisfactory. The MAA eliminates this problem by setting
criteria for becoming an arbitrator and proposing a system to ensure and
maintain competence.3
F. Procedural Deficiencies of Arbitration
Professor Stone describes four additional procedural deficiencies of
arbitration that the MAA addresses. She argues that some arbitration
policies: (1) prevent government agencies like OSHA from enforcing their
laws; (2) reduce the statute of limitations; (3) alter the burden of proof; and
(4) allow for untrained arbitrators m' These complaints are all addressed by
the MAA. The MAA allows employees to file claims with government
court in following either of these two cases should award damages consistent with the federal
statute.
344. Additionally, the AAA has already adopted the Guide for Employment Arbitrators,
(visited Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.adr.org/guides/employmentguide.html>, which was
approved by the American Bar Association, an organization which similarly maintains
provisions for requiring arbitrators to award damages consistent with federal law. The AAA
states that:
In accordance with the National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes, the arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems
just and equitable, including any remedy or relief that would be available to the
parties had the matter been heard in court. This authority includes the right to
award compensatory and exemplary (or punitive) damages and other remedies
to the extent those remedies would be available under applicable law in court.
Id. at 11. This language is ambiguous regarding the ability of the arbitrator to deny participants
relief that would otherwise be available under applicable law in court. It is also unclear whether
arbitrators should heed the "law" created only by statute, or additionally by past judicial rulings.
345. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 17.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 307-09.
347. See Stone, supra note 311, at 1042.
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agencies, maintains the statute of limitations set forth by the law, requires
that arbitrators follow the established burden of proof, and sets forth
standards for licensing requirements for arbitrators. In fact, arbitrators will
be at least as qualified, and maybe more qualified, than most judges.
Arbitrators will certainly be more qualified than juries.
Besides being easily addressed by the MAA, Professor Stone's
arguments are based on questionable grounds. For example, Professor
Stone criticizes the 180-day statute of limitations in the Center for Public
Resource's ("CPR") model arbitration agreement because "[i]n contrast,
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in some circumstances
employees have 300 days to file suit." 8 The statute of limitations in Title
VII cases is 180 days. 9 The time period is increased to 300 days in states
where a local or state agency shares jurisdiction with the EEOC.350 The
increase is probably to account for the confusion and administrative
problems that occur when agencies have concurrent jurisdiction.
Employees may need 300 days to learn where, how, and why they can file
their claims. The CPR follows the statutes and uses the 180-day period.35" '
This makes sense. Although there is no need to increase the statute of
limitations when all claims are filed with the employer, the MAA adopts
the 300-day limit for such claims.
Professor Stone also contends that the CPR's burden of proof limits
employee rights.35 The CPR states that employees must prove that their
terminations were not based on legitimate business reasons. Professor
Stone maintains that this is unfair because it is more onerous than "the
usual burden in labor arbitrations, in which the employer typically has the
burden of proving just cause for dismissal."'3 -4  This is the wrong
comparison. The burden of proof in the arbitration of discrimination
claims should be compared with that of the forum that it is replacing,
federal court discrimination litigation. There is no basis for comparing it to
the burden allocated to employers in discharge and discipline cases arising
out of just cause provisions in collective bargaining agreements. 55 In
348. IL at 1039-42.
349. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
350. See id.
351. See Stone, supra note 311, at 1040.
352. See id. at 1041.
353. See id, at 1040.
354. Stone, supra note 311, at 1040.
355. Professor Stone's comparison of the burden of proof utilized in arbitrations involving
union contracts' just cause provisions with the burden of proof in discrimination arbitrations is
inappropriate. Equally inappropriate is her comparison of the damages typically awarded at just
cause arbitrations with those awarded in jury verdicts. Stone states that that in arbitration an
unjustly dismissed employee may only be awarded reinstatement with no back pay while jury
awards for unjustly dismissed employees receive six-figure awards. See id. at 1047 n.197. This
comparison is misleading because the damages arising out of just cause provisions in union
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litigation, employees bear the burden of proving that the company
discriminated.56 Professor Stone also states that the CPR does not account
for "mixed motive" cases. 57 The MAA expressly states that the burden of
proof in arbitration claims will be the same as that in federal court. Thus,
plaintiffs will have the same burden of proof in arbitration as they would in
court even if the case would have been tried under a "mixed motive"
approach.
VI. ARGUMENTS AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION
In this section we address arguments that attack the core concept of
arbitration. It is our position that these arguments are either invalid
because they rest on unproven and contestable assumptions, or are
acceptable when compared to the problems that are endemic to the current
system.
A. The Arbitral Process Is Private in Nature and Thus Allows for Little
Public Accountabilit s5
Under this heading, the EEOC argues that a necessary component of
enforcing discrimination law is that all cases be public.359 This argument is
erroneous because it rests on a questionable premise and ignores the reality
of the current system.
Despite the EEOC's premise, it is not clear that society is better off if
all cases are placed in the public domain. If the results of the EEOC's
investigation process are correct, more than 90% of the cases filed lack
merit? Despite this assessment, plaintiffs' lawyers know that employers
contracts are always limited to back pay and reinstatement. Moreover, the arbitrator is deciding
the nebulous subject of just cause, not the existence of reprehensible discrimination. Such are
simply not comparable with tort-based lawsuits that do not have such damage caps. See id.
356. See McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
357. See Stone, supra note 311, at 1041. A mixed motive case occurs where the plaintiff
proves that discrimination was a motivating factor in the employer's decision. If the plaintiff
meets this burden, the employer can prevail only if it proves that it would have made the
decision regardless of the unlawful motivation. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228
(1989). Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 the court can award attorneys' fees, costs, and a
declaratory judgment to plaintiffs who meet their initial burden, but do not prevail. Stone's
argument is misleading because it fails to mention that only a small minority of cases are
classified as mixed motive cases. Instead, in the vast majority of cases the burden of proof
always remains with the plaintiff. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir.
1992).
358. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 17, at V-A-1.
359. See idL
360. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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in certain industries cannot afford the publicity of even a baseless lawsuit.
The public nature of cases affords the opportunity for claimants to extort
settlements from innocent employers who fear negative publicity. Even in
public trials where employers are vindicated of any wrongdoing, or when
no adjudication process takes place because of early resolution, employers
can be harmed by injurious publicity associated with the perception that
"where there's smoke, there's fire"--the belief that employees' claims
must have some merit.36" ' In addition to hurting employers, there is
evidence that plaintiffs who win at trial are also harmed by the publicity of
their trials.
362
Although the critics imply that the current system provides public
adjudication, this ignores reality. The vast majority of cases are either
dismissed by the EEOC or privately settled. 63
Despite the problems with public adjudication, there are some cases
that should not be settled in private. For example, some cases allow courts
to clarify contested issues, develop novel theories of law, or deter future
reprehensible behavior by awarding high damages for egregious conduct.
314
At this time, it is still unclear whether, under Gilmer, the EEOC may
pursue cases in federal court. However, under the MAA, the EEOC does
have such a right. Cases falling under the national enforcement plan would
therefore be publicized. The cases that would be adjudicated privately are
the B and C cases that, if not arbitrated, would likely be settled privately or
dropped. In either case, the resolution is nonpublic. Given the high
361. One example of this is embodied by a statement made by the Chairman and CEO of
Flagstar Companies, Inc. in reference to the resolution of the Denny's racial discrimination
claims which severely injured the restaurant chain's national reputation: "We decided to attempt
to resolve the claims because it became clear to us that the costs of litigating all of them would
be unacceptably high, not only in terms of attorneys' fees but also in terms of continuing public
perception of an adverse relationship between Denny's and its African-American customers."
The closing remark in this statement was a plea to "customers and potential customers who still
doubt us" to "please give us another chance to serve you." Statement from Jerome J.
Richardson, Chairman and CEO Flagstar Companies, Inc., Bus. WIRE, May 24, 1994, at 1.
362. See Saltzman, supra note 109.
363. Furthermore, under the current system, only about 20% of employment discrimination
cases are actually published. A study done by Donohue and Siegelman indicate that the 20% of
cases that is published tends not to be representative of the rest of the employment
discrimination litigation caseload. See Peter Siegelman & John I Donohue, III, Studying the
Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination
Cases, 24 L. & Soc'Y REv. 1133, 1155 (1990) (indicating that published opinions tend to be
more complex and to involve higher dollar awards than unpublished opinions). Even if every
mandatory agreement were declared void, only one out of every five employment
discrimination cases would be publicly accountable. Thus, even if Gilmer agreements were
declared illegal, employers trying to avoid public accountability would have as easy a time as
they would under the current law.
364. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. of Am., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 164 (C.D. Ill.
1997).
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number of meritless cases,3 " it is appropriate to allow A cases to be public
and the B and C cases to be private. The MAA operationalizes this
approach by allowing the EEOC to pursue A cases publicly and for
arbitrators to privately hear B and C cases.
B. Mandatory Arbitration Systems Include Procedural and Structural
Biases Against Discrimination PlaintiffS
66
Both the EEOC and Professor Stone argue that arbitration is unfair
because of what some refer to as arbitration's "systematic pro-employer
effect on the outcomes of disputes."'3 67 To support this assumption, which
attacks the credibility of the entire profession,3'6 the EEOC and Professor
Stone rely on flawed data and negative assumptions. Both rely on a study
that surveyed employment discrimination arbitration awards in the
securities industry.369 This study found that "employers stand a greater
chance of success in arbitration than in court before a jury and are
subjected to 'smaller' damage awards. 370 They then make the common,
but arguably erroneous, leap that such results mean that arbitrators are
biased against employees.
In fact, even if employers fare better at arbitration than in federal
court, and employees who win at arbitration tend to receive smaller awards
than those in federal court, there is no evidence of anything systematic or
implicitly unfair with arbitration as a process for resolving employment-
related disputes. Assuming arguendo that both statements are provable
(i.e., that employers tend to win arbitrations more often than in federal
court, and that employee-plaintiffs receive lower awards at arbitration than
they do in court victories), there are several factors that are likely to
account for these distinctions.
365. As explained earlier, the EEOC finds that 92% of the cases are without merit. See
supra note 77 and accompanying text. While we do argue that this number is inflated because
of the EEOC's policies and procedures, we do believe that many cases are without merit.
366. See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 17, at V-B.
367. Stone, supra note 311, at 1040.
368. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[I]f the
arbitrators who are assigned to hear and decide statutory claims adhere to the professional and
ethical standards set by arbitrators in the context of collective bargaining, there is little reason
for concern.").
369. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 15, at V-B & n.14
(citing Stuart H. Bompey & Andrea H. Stempel, Four Years Later: A Look at Compulsory
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims After Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 21 EMP. REL. L.J 21 (1995)).
370. Ia at 43.
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1. Why Are Employers More Successful in Arbitration than in
Litigation?
There is evidence of strong jury predisposition to side with employees
and against employers."7 A five-year poll (from 1993 to 1998) of six to ten
thousand persons in juror pools from jurisdictions across the country
indicated that juries favor employees in employment discrimination
cases.372 This survey reveals several germane results. Sixty-nine percent of
the respondents agreed that "many company decision-makers' promotion
decisions are influenced by an employee's age, sex, or race., 373 Eighty-one
percent agreed that "discrimination is still a major problem in the
workplace," and 62% felt that "employee rights are not well protected in
our society."'374 Sixty-seven percent agreed that "too many workers are
treated unfairly by the company they work for."375  Fifty-three percent
agreed that "executives of companies will lie to increase their profits,"
while 75% said that they "would tend to believe a woman who says she has
been sexually harassed at work.' 376  It is no wonder then that Robert
Coulson of the AAA reported that the driving force behind employers
wanting to use ADR techniques generally is to avoid facing juries. 7
An argument that juries may be biased is supported by a study,
conducted on statistical records compiled by the Federal Judicial Center for
employment cases litigated in federal court and terminated during the
period from June 1, 1992 to May 31, 1994 that compared the outcomes of
371. In addition to the statistics cited below, there are several studies on jury predispositions
and attitudes in the employment law setting that confirm the general results contained below.
See, e.g., JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY § 7-108 (1987);
Michael Fried et al., Juror Selection: An Analysis of Voir Dire in THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICA: A CRITCAL OvERVIENV 47,52-53 (Rita James Simon ed., 1975); Valerie P. Hans, The
Jury's Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1989, at 177, 197.
372. See Dispute Dynamics, Inc. ("DDI"), Presentation on Workplace Statistics (on file with
authors). DDI is a reputable consultation firm that conducted the survey set forth here.
373. l
374. kL
375. l
376. IdL
377. See Employers Reluctant to Embrace Mandatory Arbitration, Survey Finds, supra note
113, at A-14. Employers' fear of juries makes them more susceptible to settle a case to avoid
litigation. This would affect the equations described in note 108 by increasing the probability of
settlement ("Ps"), and hence will make plaintiff cases more attractive to attorneys. But at what
cost? Cases will settle without adjudication. Employers will be extorted into paying for de
facto severance and nuisance settlements. If there is a mandatory arbitration provision in place,
attorneys might be less apt to take cases because they are readily settled, but instead will place
greater emphasis on the second equation-the probability of winning ("Pw"). This is desirable
because fewer cases will be settled without adjudication and extortion would be traded off for
justice.
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cases in jury trials to those where a judge decided the outcome of the
case.78 Two significant findings are worth noting. First, employees won
twice as frequently before juries than they did before judges." Second, in
cases litigated without a jury in which the employee prevailed, the verdicts
ranged from $1,000 to $5 million with a mean of $167,450 and a median of
$40,000."0 The results in jury trials were significantly higher: awards
ranged from $1,000 to $8 million with the mean of $417,178, and a median
of $106,500."' In addition, the average of the five highest jury awards
exceeded the average of the highest five court verdicts by more than
350%.112 It would certainly be spurious to conclude from these statistics
that judges are biased against employees. And yet, critics of mandatory
arbitration are quick to accept the argument that arbitrators are biased
against employees based on a tenuous, and preliminary, showing analogous
to this one; just because employees win less often and are awarded less
money in front of arbitrators does not prove that arbitrators are biased
against them. We believe that judges and arbitrators-trained professionals
whose livelihood and personal and professional credibility is based on
being fair and impartial-are less likely to be biased than the six, eight, or
twelve men and women comprising jury panels-some of whom may not
perceive their civic responsibilities as graciously as others.
More favorable employer success rates before arbitrators, compared to
before juries, may also be attributed to arbitration-critics' disregard of a
procedural distinction between the two forums. Litigation is a three-step
process, whereas arbitration is a one-step process. In litigation, the
employer may prevail by filing dispositive motions prior to trial. There are
no motions to dismiss or summary judgment motions in arbitration. In the
study cited by Professor Stone, cases where employers prevail in motions
to dismiss or in summary judgment are not included in plaintiffs' litigation
success rate."3 The only litigation cases that the study accounts for are
those that survive dispositive motions and are heard by a jury. It is obvious
that plaintiffs' winning percentages increase dramatically when numerous
losses are not counted in the equation. The inflated rate is then compared
378. See Howard, supra note 108, at 42.
379. See id Employees won 19% of the trials without juries, and 38% of the trials with
juries.
380. See id. If the highest 10% of the verdicts were eliminated, the range is reduced to
$1,000-$250,000, the mean to $58,060, and the median to $35,060.
381. See id. Howard notes that the fact that the mean is about four times larger than the
median indicates an inordinate influence of extremely high verdicts. Eliminating the highest
10% of verdicts decreases the range to $1,000-$850,000.
382. See id.
383. See Stuart Bompey & Michael Pappas, Compulsory Arbitration in Employment
Discrimination Claims: The Impact of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1993 ABA SEc.
ON EMP. & LAB. LAw EO COMM. PAPERS.
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to the plaintiffs' success rate in the one-step arbitration process. These
factors lead to the unsupported conclusion that juries are more favorable to
plaintiffs than arbitrators.
A third reason for the skewed results of the study is the probability
that lawyers are more likely to arbitrate than to litigate marginally
meritorious claims. Arbitration is less risky for a lawyer because the out-
of-pocket expenses and opportunity costs are significantly less than those
in litigation, and there is no disincentive to taking a "fees" case.74 This
argument is tempered, however, by the fact that the probability of success
and recovery are lower in arbitration than litigation.
The final reason for the employers' success rate in arbitration is that
employers with Gilmer agreements are less likely to settle meritless cases
because of the high costs of defenseY'5 This means that when plaintiffs'
lawyers are wrong about their case selection they will lose at arbitration.
Such losses are another example of pro-employer bias in arbitration.
Where there is no arbitration provision, and the law firm makes a bad
decision to take a case, the firm may still settle the case before going to
litigation because employers will be motivated by the defense costs.
2. Damage Awards Are Lower when Arbitration Is the Forum
The major reason why damages are lower in arbitration than in
litigation may be explained by mathematics. In discrimination lawsuits,
back pay is the major component of the potential award. Back pay is
generally calculated from the time of the adverse action to the disposition
of the case. In federal court, it takes an average of 2.5 years, and as long as
eight years, to litigate a case.16  In arbitration, however, the entire
adjudication process takes an average of 8.6 months to complete. 7
Because of the differences in time for when back pay is calculated, it
makes perfect sense that plaintiffs' damage awards will be greater in court
than in arbitration.
A 1993 survey of 4,000 AAA arbitrations conducted in 1992 also
countered the charge that arbitration awards generally fall in the middle of
the request sought by the claimant.38 In only 11% of the cases did the
award fall between 40% to 59% of the claim.38 9 In 26% of the cases, the
384. See supra notes 104-05, 113-15 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 101. Lawyers will focus less on the probability of settling ("Ps") and
more on the probability of winning ("Pw").
386. See supra note 83.
387. See supra note 113.
388. See Bompey et al., supra note 21, at 25, (citing Arbitrators Do Not "Split the Baby" in
Rendering Awards, WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP., Oct. 1993, at 241).
389. See id.
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award exceeded 80% of the claim. 390
Another reason for the skewed damage awards may be explained by
jury predisposition. Sixty-one percent of those polled in the Dispute
Dynamics study said that "an important function of juries in America is to
send messages to corporations to improve their behavior."39' Sixty-eight
percent agreed that "if a company was found guilty of causing injury to
someone, I would want to award punitive damages."3' One may argue that
the preconceived antiemployer sentiment of juries result in inflated court
awards for plaintiffs, and that the lower arbitration awards are really the
more fair assessments of redress.
3. The So-Called Repeat Player Effect
The EEOC also relies on research conducted by Professor Lisa
Bingham of Indiana University to support its contention that arbitrators
favor employers because it is more likely that an arbitrator will be rehired
by a large employer than by any one plaintiff.393 This alleged bias is the so-
called "repeat player" effect. Before discussing this research, we must note
that the concept of repeat player bias is tenuous. The argument is that
arbitrators will rule in favor of employers because they are more likely than
plaintiffs to hire the arbitrator again. Such an argument makes no sense.
No rational plaintiff would select an arbitrator who does not have a well-
established reputation for integrity; arbitrators with skewed track records
find themselves jobless.3 4 Because of this fact, the repeat player effect
would exist only if: (1) arbitrators are able to hide their past relationships
from the plaintiffs and the agencies in charge of arbitrator selection; or (2)
plaintiffs and their attorneys are so unsophisticated that they do not do any
research before exercising their right to help select the person who will
decide their case.
Despite the fact that the concept is illogical, Professor Bingham's
research supports the hypothesis that the repeat player bias does have an
effect on arbitration results. Professor Bingham found that employees lost
in twenty-six out of thirty-one cases where the defendant-employer was a
390. See id
391. DDI, supra note 372.
392. Ia
393. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE
RTs. & EMP. POL'YJ. 189 (1997).
394. See Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of
Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1095, 1108 (1993) (reporting that a GAO Report
found no indication of pro-industry bias in arbitrator decisions in "industry-sponsored arbitration
forums"). Although these arbitrations deal primarily with investor-brokerage disputes, the
implication that arbitrators would be expected to be biased in favor of their employers is refuted
by empirical evidence to the contrary.
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"repeat-player." '395 When the employer was not a repeat-player, employees
lost in fifty-nine out of 201 cases. 6
In analyzing Bingham's results, it is critical to point out the
exceptionally small sample size used in Bingham's study-a mere 232
cases, all taken from 1993."" Also relevant is the fact that Bingham used
only thirty-one repeat player cases as compared to 201 non-repeat player
cases.3 98 This severely limits the reliability of the study. However, due to
the heavy reliance of both the EEOC and Professor Stone on the results,
this Article will assume, arguendo, that the results of the article are reliable.
It is unlikely that arbitrator bias is the underlying reason for
Bingham's results because she did not demonstrate that arbitration success
rates improved if a company was a repeat player. Bingham's research
merely compares win rates for repeat players with those of single players.
Moreover, according to Bingham, repeat players faired as well in their first
cases as they did in subsequent cases. The flaw in this study is best
explained with an example. Suppose that Companies A and B are large
employers similar to those in Bingham's study,3 99 and both conduct
arbitrations on January 15. Company A wins and Company B loses. Three
months later Company A has another arbitration and prevails again.
Employing Bingham's logic and methodology, one would conclude that
repeat players (A) win 100% of the time, single players 03) lose 100% of
the time, and therefore arbitrators favor repeat players. However, there is
no evidence that the arbitrators who heard A's first case, and B's only case,
knew that Company A would be a repeat player and that Company B would
not be. Both were large employers who could potentially be sources of
future business. Without evidence that the arbitrators could identify future
repeat players, it is impossible to make inferences about arbitrator bias.
Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that the repeat. players won more
arbitrations because of arbitrator bias.
One could argue that arbitrators may be able to identify potential
repeat players in initial arbitrations because their arbitration agreements are
company-wide policies, not clauses in individual contracts. However, as
Bingham notes, bias may not explain why employers with company-wide
policies are so successful. Company-wide policies generally affirm that all
employees are employed at will. Thus, employees could only prevail by
pigeonholing their cases into the limited range of legally accepted at will
exceptions. This is a difficult task. Moreover, an employer with a
company-wide policy will have the task of identifying which cases it
395. See Bingham, supra note 393, at 210.
396. See id.
397. See id. at 209.
398. See id. at 210.
399. Telephone Interviews with Professor Lisa Bingham, Indiana University (July 1997).
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cannot win. The company will likely settle such cases. Alternatively, the
single-player employers were likely those that had contracts limiting the
employers' ability to fire employees to instances where doing so
constituted just or reasonable cause, with a small number of high level
employees. In such cases, employers had to prove that they had cause to
terminate, a much more difficult standard. These employers were not
experienced, and therefore may not have known when to settle.
If there is an underlying bias, the MAA corrects it. Under the MAA,
arbitrators' opinions are reviewed every two years to ensure that the
opinions are sound. In addition, an arbitrator cannot hear a case before any
given employer twice in a two-year period. Most importantly, arbitrators
are selected by the designated agency, not the parties.
If bias does exist, and the MAA does not resolve the issue, we believe
that plaintiffs' attorneys will mitigate any concerns. The state and federal
agencies will continue to provide employees with a list of attorneys who
specialize in such cases. Eventually, these attorneys will be in the same
position as the management attorney to accept or reject an arbitrator. Thus,
arbitrators will have the same incentive to please the repeat player
plaintiffs' attorneys as they do the repeat player employers.0 Employees
who have decent cases, and conduct limited due diligence, will come to
understand this fact and will therefore utilize these qualified attorneys.
Professor Bingham argues that plaintiffs' lawyers will not serve this
function. She explains that lower wage employees need their attorneys to
take cases on a contingency basis401 Because empirical evidence indicates
that jury awards in discharge cases are greater than arbitration awards,
attorneys will be less likely to take arbitration-bound cases on
contingency.4c Professor Bingham does note, however, that the cost of
arbitrating is significantly less than that of litigating. 3 Since these lower
costs allow employees access to adjudication-the ultimate benefit and
goal of litigation-without forcing an attorney to become a "partner" in the
case, we believe that plaintiffs' lawyers will be more likely to arbitrate than
litigate a discrimination case. As Donohue notes, absent clear and
outrageous liability, it is economically infeasible to take a case to court if
the plaintiff earns less than $450 per week.' This is not the case in
arbitration. Thus, it is perhaps more likely that a class of lawyers will
specialize in plaintiffs' arbitration and counterbalance the alleged
employers' repeat player benefit. 5
400. See Estreicher, supra note 209, at 1355.
401. See Bingham, supra note 393, at 199.
402. See id at 199-200.
403. See id
404. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 22, at 1006.
405. See Estreicher, supra note 209, at 210. He argues that:
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Professor Bingham also notes that the high costs of litigation allow
plaintiffs with weak cases to find counsel who are not willing to litigate the
case, but are willing to use the cost of defense to obtain a nuisance
settlement.406 According to Bingham, such settlements can exceed
$10,000.' This theory is supported by the model described above which
determines how plaintiffs' lawyers decide to take cases. 408 A case may be
easily "settle-able," and hence very attractive to an attorney because the
defendant's proclivity and willingness to settle is inherently greater when
the risk the defendant is avoiding-litigation-is costlier. Professor
Bingham argues that arbitration may put an end to this practice. If so, she
has conceived of another positive aspect of arbitration: it reduces the
opportunities for extortion.
C. Contracts of Adhesion
Professor Stone argues that Gilmer agreements are inherently unfair
because they are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 41 She is correct in
that employees have little bargaining power. They can either accept the
terms and conditions of employment or not accept the job. However, this is
not unique in employee-management relations. Employees who join a
company with a union contract immediately give up their right to negotiate
any term and condition of employment in exchange for union
representation. In many cases, the terms of a union contract, which
frequently include provisions that base layoffs and promotions on seniority,
are contrary to the interests of newly hired employees. In some cases,
unions can and do negotiate away rights imposed by employment
statutes. 41° Regardless of their opinions on these subjects, new employees
are left with a take-it-or-leave-it scenario. Finally, except in right to work
states, employees are told that if they do not pay union dues they will be
fired.
In addition to the union setting, there are numerous other terms and
[A]rbitrators chosen on prior occasions are unlikely to be deemed acceptable by
claimant representatives. Moreover, the real repeat players will be the lawyers
for both defense and plaintiff bars in the area-such as members of the National
Employment Lawyers Association, a plaintiff group-who can be counted on to
share information within their group about the track records of proposed
arbitrators.
Id.
406. See Bingham, supra note 393, at 200.
407. See iL
408. See supra note 108.
409. See Stone, supra note 311, at 1036.
410. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983); New York Tel. Co.,
1989-1990 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 16,173 (July 31, 1990).
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conditions of employment that are offered to employees on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. For instance, health insurance, life insurance, pension plans,
and various ERISA provisions (e.g., vesting policies), as well as
noncompetition agreements, vacation pay, sick time, and holiday pay are
conditions of employment that employers almost always offer to employees
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. If mandatory arbitration as a condition of
employment represents such an intolerable failure, union shops, benefit
plans, and other conditions of employment that are part and parcel of basic
freedom of contract should also be abolished.
D. Arbitration Limits Discovery41'
In this section, the EEOC complains that arbitration limits discovery,
and is generally unsuitable as a forum for class actions:"2 Again, class
actions will be litigated, not arbitrated. 4 3  As for discovery, the MAA
provides for depositions and document requests. It just places time and
volume limits that prevent employers from "big fim ing" 4 employees and
driving up the costs of defense. Such limits on discovery can be socially
beneficial because reducing the costs of adjudicating-by having
arbitration replace litigation4 5-should result in lawyers accepting
plaintiffs' cases that would have otherwise been rejected.
VII. CONCLUSION
We acknowledge that mandatory arbitration is not perfect. It is,
however, a viable alternative offering favorable trade-offs for the ills
endemic to the current system. Thirty years ago Congress attempted to
develop a system that would eliminate discrimination in the workplace, and
provide fairness to litigants. Two major components of this system were
that it: (1) provided access to a fair adjudicatory process for all employees
regardless of pay rate; and (2) would not force employers to spend
excessive amounts of time and money defending baseless claims. As this
411. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 17, at V-A-3.
412. See id.
413. The EEOC can and does file class actions against employers where such actions are
appropriate. Indeed, the EEOC is more likely to file a class action since the procedural
constraints of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 do not apply to the EEOC. See FED. R Civ.
P. 23. While the EEOC does not bring many class action suits each year, it would be specious
to reason that mandatory arbitration agreements are preventing it from doing so.
414. "Big firming" means utilizing the resources of the employer and its large law firm to
coerce plaintiff's counsel to respond to an excessive number of discovery requests so that the
plaintiff will either withdraw, accept an undervalued settlement, or continue to pursue the case
without being adequately prepared.
415. This is "CL" in step 4 of the decision making process outlined supra note 108.
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Article demonstrates, the EEOC and the federal courts have failed to
answer this charge. Instead, the current system benefits the employers and
employees who are bad actors and hurts the good actors. This system,
which leaves plaintiffs without remedy in the overwhelming majority of
cases, forces de facto severance settlement of claims without regard to the
merits, and eliminates access to fair adjudication for the vast majority of
parties-actually perpetuating discrimination. Despite the government's
best intentions, it cannot "fix" the system by fine-tuning the current process
or increasing funding. The costs associated with investigation and federal
litigation are simply too high. A system that revolves around such high
cost adjudication mechanisms can never fairly and feasibly address and
eliminate discrimination in the workplace.
There are two fundamental flaws with the arguments against
mandatory arbitration. First, so-called employee advocates perpetuate a
myth of government protection when it does not exist. Second, in their
haste to run to the aide of the "little guy," or the "have-nots," the
employee-rights advocates overlook the fact that employees whose
statutory rights are not violated should not receive relief. A system that
perpetuates de facto severance and allows delay tactics and the ominous
threat of litigation costs and negative publicity to determine who gets relief
and who does not is not a fair and just system. The little guy may triumph
in the short run, but society is harmed in the long run.
Mandatory agreements to arbitrate level the playing field by providing
an adjudicatory process for those who would otherwise be either forced to
settle for an unjust amount or receive no relief at all. This Article classifies
three types of problems with mandatory arbitration. The first are the faults
that are easily corrected by the MAA. The second are those problems that
are identified, but may not exist and this paper explains why. The third are
the inherent drawbacks to arbitration. We argue that they are acceptable in
light of the alternatives.
There are three possible ways that the law regarding mandatory
arbitration can develop. First, Congress can succumb to the wishes of the
EEOC and the employee rights advocates by outlawing mandatory
arbitration. Such an outright legislative ban would further institutionalize
an unfair system under the guise of government protection for employees.
The only protection that such a ban would provide would come in the form
of job security for EEOC employees and for the large jury verdicts about
which plaintiffs' lawyers dream.
The second option is to leave the issue to the courts. Courts will, in
response to plaintiffs' arguments, continue to decide the enforceability of
arbitration agreements. This is undesirable because it would take years to
develop any uniform interpretation. Moreover, millions of dollars will
have to be spent in order for each circuit to decide what represents a fair
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and just alternative to the current "mess." Employers that wish to avoid
such costs will be left with the status quo-de facto severance and the
settlement of meritless cases due to fear of defense costs. Employees who
do not have the good fortune of working for an employer with a fair and
just arbitration policy will either have to deal with the current system of
delays and barriers to adjudication or accept an unfair arbitration policy.
The third option is for Congress to enact legislation that will establish a
uniform system of mandatory arbitration provisions. The MAA is but one
example of the type of legislation that could be passed. The MAA is not
perfect. Nor does it cure all ills endemic to the system. But this was not
our intention in devising the MAA. Instead, we created it to prove that it is
possible to address completely many of the issues that the critics imply are
insurmountable problems. Those issues that are not "correctable" are, as
we have shown, not really problems, or acceptable when compared to what
has been allowed to develop over the past thirty years.
To paraphrase Professor James Henderson, "just because one person,
or even one hundred people, are injured by paring knives, this does not
make the paring knife a defective product per se in the eyes of the law. ' 4" 6
It is easy to lose sight of one's ultimate goals when debating the nitty-gritty
of mandatory arbitration--even the term "mandatory" is debated.41 7 It is
also easy to spin hypothetical situations in which an employee is almost
coerced into signing a one-sided employment contract with an arbitration
provision buried on page 977 and is then badly harmed by not being able to
reach a jury. Such hypothetical situations, even the plausible ones, do not
make agreements to arbitrate per se defective (read: unlawful). Much like
paring knives, arbitration can potentially cut parties unfairly. And the most
natural reaction when critics hear of such incidences is to declare the whole
system defective, while losing sight of the countless number of individuals
who benefit from it. But this would be like throwing the baby out with the
bath water. This paper therefore stands for the proposition that the law
should recognize the positive aspects of contractual agreements to arbitrate
employment disputes and continually design safeguards to ensure its proper
handling-save the baby-and construct a new sink. If this course is not
adopted, we will only be perpetuating the myth of government protection
416. Professor James Henderson, Lecture at the Cornell Law School (Nov. 12, 1997).
Professor Henderson is one of the authors of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUcTS
LIABILrry (1998) as well as the author of several casebooks on torts and products liability and a
countless number of academic articles.
417. See Ware, supra note 315, at 104 nn.102-03. "'This term ['mandatory'] is sometimes
used to describe arbitration resulting from agreements to arbitrate future disputes, since once an
enforceable agreement has been made, arbitration is 'mandatory.' This is extremely confusing
language because it ignores altogether the consensual element in contracts."' Id at 108 (quoting
1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBrrRATION LAW § 2.5, at 2:36 n.5 (1994) (citation
omitted)).
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of employee rights that permits discrimination to continue in the workplace
and encourages plaintiffs to extort innocent employers.
